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ABSTRACT
In this thesis I contribute to the applied study of households’ consump-
tion and saving behaviour. In the first chapter I introduce and explain
why it is relevant to understand how households react to income shocks in
terms of their consumption and saving decisions.
The second chapter is inspired by a recent paper by Krueger and Perri
(2011), who argue that the observed response of household wealth to income
shocks, which is smaller over long periods, provides evidence in favour of the
classic permanent-income model with perfect financial markets. Whether a
model with financial market imperfections, however, such as the standard
incomplete-markets model with liquidity constraints, can also generate such
a wealth response crucially depends on the importance of precautionary
wealth accumulation. I structurally estimate a model with a precautionary-
savings motive and show that it can generate the observed wealth responses
in the data. I further show that the wealth responses to income shocks do
not allow us to rule out financial market imperfections.
In the third chapter I extend the analysis, studying empirically what
can be learned from international evidence on the way in which households
react to income. I use detailed panel data from newly available surveys of
Chile, Spain and the United States. Although it compares three different
countries with dissimilar levels of development in their financial markets,
the evidence suggests that the amount of precautionary savings in these
economies is low and that household behaviour is not strongly influenced
by the presence of borrowing constraints. The structural estimation for all
countries suggests a low target level of wealth resulting from high levels of
impatience or low levels of risk aversion.
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In the fourth chapter I extend the analysis to the real estate prop-
erties owned by the households. I revisit the Italian data, building on
Kaplan and Violante (2014) who have argued that a substantial fraction
of wealthy households with illiquid wealth, such as real estate, behave as
hand-to-mouth consumers. In exploring the data, I find that, in the Italian
sample, households which adjust their illiquid wealth show responses to in-
come shocks like permanent-income consumers. Instead households which
do not adjust their illiquid wealth, and whose behaviour in general can
thus not be characterised by the first order conditions, show responses to
income shocks which suggest a stronger precautionary-saving motive, such
as wealthy hand-to-mouth consumers might be expected to show.
The fifth chapter provides the conclusions of the thesis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis contributes to the empirical literature which studies households’
consumption and saving behaviour. The thesis aims to discover whether
we can learn about the motives for saving from consumption and wealth
accumulation decisions in the aftermath of income shocks. In particular, I
use these decisions to infer the strength of the precautionary-savings motive
relative to the standard consumption-smoothing motive in the permanent-
income theory.
Precautionary-saving behaviour depends on financial market imperfec-
tions such as borrowing constraints. Thus, the strength of the precau-
tionary-saving motive can be assessed to indicate whether financial market
imperfections, in the form of borrowing constraints, play a role in house-
holds’ savings decisions.
Quantifying the amount of precautionary savings in the data has been
challenging for the literature. In this thesis I provide evidence on the
strength of the precautionary-savings motive which is very important for
policy purposes. For instance, any policy measure aimed to meet the needs
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of social security system should consider the relevance of precautionary sav-
ings: whether households use such savings to self-insure, which households
do it and to what extent.
In a seminal paper Krueger and Perri (2011) use unique Italian panel
data on consumption, wealth and income to analyse the predictions of
wealth responses to income shocks. They test the predictions of workhorse
models and conclude that the permanent-income model describes the data
best. In this, the wealth response to income shocks declines if measured
over longer time horizons. In particular, Krueger and Perri (2011) argue
that the wealth responses to income shocks allow us to figure out whether
and to what extent financial market imperfections matter for households
decisions.
In Chapter 2, to study the response of consumption and wealth accu-
mulation to income shocks, I contrast the predictions of two leading mod-
els: the permanent-income model and the precautionary-saving incomplete-
markets model.
I summarise the contribution of this chapter as follows. With respect
to the permanent-income model, I generalise the results of Krueger and
Perri (2011) and find that high levels of income persistence are needed
to obtain decreasing responses of wealth over time. With respect to the
precautionary-savings model I provide a non-trivial example in which this
model also generates a declining wealth response over time. Furthermore,
I structurally estimate the model and find that once the precautionary-
savings model matches the sample mean and median net worth, to quan-
titatively discipline the strength of the precautionary motive, the wealth
profile is decreasing over time and contributes to a better fit of the model.
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Overall, I show that the declining wealth responses to income shocks over
time may not be considered as evidence for the classic permanent-income
model with perfect capital markets, and thus as evidence against the exis-
tence of borrowing constraints.
To what extent the strength of precautionary savings motives is strong
enough to generate an increasing, or decreasing, profile of wealth to income
shocks over time is an empirical issue. In Chapter 3 I explore what can
be learnt from the international evidence in this regard. Using data for
Chile, Spain and the United States I estimate the consumption and wealth
responses, applying the same selection criteria as in Chapter 2.
This is a valid question, since these three countries exhibit different
levels of development in their financial markets. A priori, I expect that
this heterogeneity may have implications for the observed responses. For
instance, in less developed countries households may face higher levels of
uncertainty in the economy, in terms of institutions, income, or economic
conditions. These characteristics, jointly with a public welfare system
which provides less support, may imply different saving behaviour from
households in less developed economies.
I construct panel data on income, consumption and wealth for Chile,
Spain and the United States. For each country I estimate the house-
holds’ responses to income shocks and then estimate a precautionary-saving
incomplete-markets model. As far as I know, this is the first research to
structurally estimate this kind of model for Chile or Spain using a relatively
new and rich dataset.
My results are as follows. I find that the wealth responses for the
three countries predicted by the model qualitatively, and quantitatively in
13
some cases, replicate the decreasing wealth responses over time in the data.
As in the case of Italy, in all three countries the predicted wealth profile
improves the fit of the model. Moreover, the model implies a low target
level of wealth, given the estimated levels of impatience and risk aversion
for the households. Surprisingly, the results suggest that the heterogeneity
in financial development across the considered countries is not as important
as expected a priori.
Considering only households which do not own real estate, as in Krueger
and Perri (2011), may imply selection biases for the results. In fact Kaplan
and Violante (2014) argue that there is a sizeable fraction of households
which behaves as if liquidity constrained, even though they have positive
net worth due to homeownership. These are the households which for
instance have not recently adjusted their housing stock, but this is illiquid
and thus compels non-durable consumption behaviour, which is similar to
that of liquidity constrained consumers.
In Chapter 4 I revisit the Italian dataset used in the second chapter
of the thesis and extend the analysis to include households with real es-
tate properties. Using the framework of Kaplan and Violante (2014) and
Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner (Forthcoming), I apply a new strategy to
identify those households which adjust their housing stock. I also char-
acterise the fraction of these households which comprises hand-to-mouth
consumers. I compare the behaviour of these households with those house-
holds which did not adjust their housing stock.
My results are as follows. The group of households that adjusted its
housing stock exhibits a decreasing profile of wealth to income shocks over
time, whereas this profile is increasing for those households which did not
14
adjust. Furthermore, I characterise the households according to their port-
folio positions and find a higher proportion of hand-to-mouth consumers
in the group of households which did not adjust its stock of durables.
These results encourage the interpretation that the upward sloping profile
of wealth may be the outcome of precautionary-saving behaviour, because
these households are relatively more constrained. This evidence supports
the hypothesis proposed by Kaplan and Violante (2014).
In summary, this thesis contributes to the literature by showing how
the slope of wealth responses to income shocks over time is influenced
by both precautionary-savings and permanent-income behaviour. The ev-
idence that I present in the different chapters supports the strategy of
identifying precautionary-savings or permanent income behaviour by look-
ing at whether the wealth response to income shocks over time increases
or decreases. Chapter 5 draws some conclusion and contains the closing
remarks of the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Financial market imperfections
and the response of household
wealth to income shocks
2.1 Introduction
The two workhorse models of consumer behaviour are the classic per-
manent-income model and the precautionary-savings incomplete markets
model. A key difference between these models is the degree of access
to financial markets. Whereas the permanent-income model allows con-
sumers to freely borrow against future earnings, the incomplete-markets
model imposes a borrowing constraint. The occasionally binding borrowing
constraint, reinforced by the usual assumption of prudence for household
preferences, implies that consumers hold precautionary savings to insure
against uninsurable shocks.
This chapter is inspired by work with Giulio Fella and Winfried Koeniger.
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The degree of financial market imperfection is hard to observe directly
but of crucial importance for the welfare effects of social insurance poli-
cies. Thus, previous research has tried to exploit different predictions of
the two models for observable variables in order to draw inferences about
the constraints that consumers face in financial markets (see the literature
surveyed by Deaton (1992), Attanasio and Weber (2010), and references in
Krueger and Perri (2011)). Such inferences are more easily made the more
information about household decisions is available so that the emergence
of panel data with information about income, consumption and wealth
over a sufficiently long period have allowed me to construct new statistical
data to test the permanent-income model against the precautionary-savings
incomplete-markets model.
Using the Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW),
which is unique for its panel information about household consumption,
income and wealth since 1987, Krueger and Perri (2011) have documented
that the observed response of household wealth to income shocks declines
over the time horizon considered. They argue that this provides evidence
in favour of the classic permanent-income model without borrowing con-
straints. I show that whether models with financial market imperfections,
such as the standard incomplete-markets model with liquidity constraints,
can generate such a wealth response crucially depends on the importance
given to precautionary wealth accumulation. This is a quantitative issue
which I address by structurally estimating a standard incomplete-markets
model by the simulated method of moments, including the observed me-
dian and mean net household worth of the SHIW sample considered by
Krueger and Perri (2011). My findings illustrate that in general a model
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with precautionary savings is able to match the declining wealth response
to income shocks observed in the data. Moreover, when I quantitatively
evaluate it for this Italian sample, the wealth profile contributes to a better
fit of the model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 I present
predictions of the permanent-income model and show a precautionary-
savings incomplete-markets model for the consumption and wealth re-
sponses to income shocks. In Section 2.3, I briefly discuss the SHIW data
which I then use to estimate the responses of wealth and consumption to
income shocks. In Section 2.4 I calibrate and estimate the two models to
assess whether they can explain the data. I conclude in Section 2.5.
2.2 Theoretical predictions for responses to
income shocks
Compared with the previous literature, Krueger and Perri (2011) use the
responses of consumption and wealth to income shocks in order to test the
permanent-income model against the precautionary-savings incomplete-
markets model. In this section I thus present the predictions of the two
models regarding these responses.
Consumers have an infinite horizon, derive utility from consumption ct
and discount the future with factor β. In each period t they decide how
much to consume ct and how many assets at+1 to hold in the next period.
The assets earn a given interest r in the small-open economy.
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The recursive problem of the agent is
v(at, yt) = max
at+1
u((1 + r)at + yt − at+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
ct
) + βEtv(at+1, yt+1)
 (2.1)
subject to
at+1 + ct = (1 + r)at + yt, (2.2)
lim
T→∞
(
1
1 + r
)T
aT+1 = 0 a.s.,
where the No-Ponzi-Game condition ensures that the intertemporal budget
constraint holds with equality.
The problem has two state variables: the endogenous asset position
at and the exogenous stochastic income yt which matters for expectations
due to the persistence of income shocks. The consumer’s stochastic labour
income yt follows the process
yt = zt + εt, (2.3)
zt = ρzt−1 + ηt,
where εt ∼ N (0, σ2ε) is a transitory income shock and ηt ∼ N
(
0, σ2η
)
is
an income shock with persistence 0 < ρ ≤ 1.1 The shocks εt and ηt are
assumed to be uncorrelated with each other in each period t and i.i.d. over
time.2
1Krueger and Perri (2011) assume a permanent income shock, i.e. ρ = 1. I also
solve the model for ρ = 1 which requires normalization of all variables by permanent
income in the recursive formulation and the further assumption of a finite time horizon
T to keep distributions stationary in the simulations. The main insights do not change
if I consider ρ = 1 instead of values of ρ very close to unity; for simplicity I focus on
persistence 0 < ρ < 1, but I elaborate the case for ρ = 1 when relevant.
2In the calibrated precautionary-savings incomplete markets model below the pro-
cess is specified for the logarithm of income since the income distribution in the data is
skewed. The specification of the process in income levels allows for simple analytic char-
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2.2.1 Permanent-income model
To derive the predictions of the permanent income model I assume a
quadratic period utility function u(ct) = −12(c−ct)2. The recursive problem
(2.1) implies that the intertemporal allocation of resources at an interior
optimum is characterised by the standard Euler equation
u′(ct) = β(1 + r)Etu′(ct+1)
which, for the assumed quadratic utility function, simplifies to
ct = (1− β(1 + r)) c+ β(1 + r)Etct+1. (2.4)
The purest version of the permanent-income model abstracts from the tilt-
ing of the consumption profile and assumes β(1 + r) = 1. Under these
assumptions, I describe how consumption, wealth and income change af-
ter transitory and persistent shocks. The proof, as for the other analytic
results in this section, is provided in the appendix.
Remark 1. In the permanent-income model with β(1 + r) = 1 and income
process (2.3), consumption, wealth and income changes are given by
∆ct =
r
1 + r
εt +
r
1 + r − ρηt ,
∆at+1 =
εt
1 + r
+
1− ρ
1 + r − ρ (ρzt−1 + ηt) ,
∆yt = ∆εt + ηt + (ρ− 1) zt−1 .
The responses of consumption and wealth to the shocks in Remark 1
acterization of the consumption and wealth response in the permanent-income model.
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are well known and hence I comment on them only briefly. Consumption
changes by the annuity value of the transitory shock εt and wealth bears the
remaining impact of that shock on resources. Consumption increases more
after the persistent shock ηt and indeed this shock affects only consumption
and not wealth if it is permanent (ρ = 1).
Obviously, the panel data which I are going to use do not contain direct
information about transitory and persistent income shocks so that, as a
next step, I use the results in Remark 1 to derive predictions for changes of
wealth and consumption after changes in observed income. I compute the
predictions of the model for changes over N periods, since I will exploit the
SHIW data, as do Krueger and Perri (2011), to compute consumption and
wealth responses to changes in labour income over two, four and six years.
I show in Section 2.4 how these predictions are affected if income shocks
are measured with error.
Remark 2. If consumers behave according to the permanent-income model
with β(1+r) = 1 and observed income follows the process (2.3), the response
of consumption and wealth to changes in income over N periods is given
by
βNc =
cov(∆Nct,∆
Nyt)
var(∆Nyt)
=
1−ρN
1−ρ
r
1+r−ρQ+
r
1+r(
(ρN−1)2
1−ρ2 +
1−ρN
1−ρ
)
Q+ 2
βNa =
cov(∆Nat+1,∆
Nyt)
var(∆Nyt)
=
1−ρN
1+ρ
1
1+r−ρQ+
1
1+r(
(ρN−1)2
1−ρ2 +
1−ρN
1−ρ
)
Q+ 2
.
with Q ≡ σ2η/σ2ε .
Remark 2 makes explicit how consumption and wealth responses to ob-
served income changes depend on the relative importance of the persistent
21
shock Q as well as on the periods N over which the change is measured.3
The following corollary states how these responses change with N .
Corollary 1. If consumers behave according to the permanent-income
model with β(1 + r) = 1 and 0 < Q <∞:
• the response of consumption to income shocks increases in the number
of periods (∂βNc /∂N > 0) if ρ = 1 or ρ < 1 is sufficiently large and
Q < Q∗c;
• the response of wealth to income shocks decreases in the number of
periods N over which the response is measured (∂βNa /∂N < 0) if
ρ = 1 or ρ < 1 and Q > Q∗a, where Q
∗
a < Q
∗
c.
These results are intuitive. Consider first the case with a permanent
income shock, ρ = 1. As the number of periods N increases, the wealth and
consumption response to income changes depends more on the cumulative
permanent shock rather than on the transitory shocks: the independently
distributed transitory shocks offset each other over a longer horizon, while
the permanent shocks accumulate. Therefore the consumption response
increases and the wealth response decreases in N .
If the component zt in the labour income process (2.3) is not permanent
but only persistent, the consumer changes his asset holdings to smooth
consumption after changes in zt. The effect of the change becomes weaker
over time: ρN decreases in N for 0 < ρ < 1. Thus, the effect of changes in
the persistent income component zt on consumption and wealth decreases
3Note that Remark 2 nests the results of Krueger and Perri (2011) for ρ = 1
since by L’Hoˆpital’s rule limρ→1 1−ρ
N
1−ρ = limρ→1
−NρN−1
−1 = N and limρ→1
(ρN−1)2
1−ρ2 =
limρ→1 1−2ρ
N+ρ2N
1−ρ2 = limρ→1
−2NρN−1+2Nρ2N−1
−2ρ = 0.
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in N ceteris paribus. Clearly, the importance of this effect for the profile
of the consumption and wealth response across N is less if persistence ρ is
greater. Corollary 1 shows that for a persistent enough 0 < ρ < 1 there
exists Q ∈ (Q∗a;Q∗c) so that the consumption response increases in N while
the wealth response decreases in N .
Table 2.1 shows the behaviour of the consumption and wealth response
as a function of N for different ρ, using parameter values r = 0.02 and
Q = 0.34 as in Krueger and Perri (2011), Tables 6 and 7, where the value
for Q is based on estimates for ση and σε from Jappelli and Pistaferri
(2006). For these plausible parameter values, the consumption response to
income shocks increases in N and the wealth response decreases in N , for all
considered values of persistence ρ. For very persistent shocks (ρ = 0.9995
or ρ = 0.995), the wealth response falls more strongly and the consumption
response increases more strongly in the number of periods N . The wealth
and consumption response are flat, as one would expect, if the shock has
very low persistence (ρ = 0.2).
Table 2.1: Persistence and the wealth response to income shocks over dif-
ferent numbers of periods N .
Consumption response Wealth response
βNc β
N
a
Number of years (N) 2 4 6 2 4 6
Persistence
0.9995 0.255 0.4 0.497 0.369 0.297 0.249
0.995 0.210 0.327 0.403 0.391 0.332 0.292
0.95 0.078 0.112 0.132 0.454 0.427 0.405
0.8 0.028 0.033 0.036 0.471 0.446 0.428
0.2 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.480 0.477 0.477
Source: Author’s calculation. Note: The parameter values are r = 0.02,
Q = 0.34.
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2.2.2 Precautionary-savings incomplete-markets
model
I contrast the predictions of the permanent-income model with the precau-
tionary-savings incomplete-markets model. I assume a CRRA period utility
function u(ct) =
(
c1−αt − 1
)
/(1 − α), α > 0. Compared with the classic
permanent-income model, the precautionary-savings incomplete-markets
model does not have a closed form solution and thus analytic results on the
response of wealth and consumption to income changes are not available.4
Appendix C provides details and references for the solution and simulation
of this standard model.
The recursive problem of the agent changes compared to the permanent-
income model since solvency now implies a borrowing constraint at+1 ≥a.
The existence of this occasionally binding borrowing constraint results in
a precautionary saving motive which, for the commonly assumed CRRA
utility function, loses strength if the agent is wealthier. Indeed, if the
agent has abundant net worth relative to the borrowing limit a so that the
constraint is binding with probability close to zero, the predictions of this
model are identical to those of the classic permanent-income model.
I now provide an intriguing example in which most consumers have
little net worth and the precautionary-savings incomplete markets model
is nonetheless able to generate wealth and consumption responses to in-
come changes that are qualitatively similar to the classic permanent-income
model. This is not obvious since, as Krueger and Perri (2011) have con-
4The special case of CARA utility without borrowing constraints, for which closed
form solutions are available, is not interesting for my purposes. Its predictions for the
consumption and wealth responses are identical to the permanent-income model because
the precautionary motive does not depend on the amount of resources available to the
agent.
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vincingly argued, a key difference between the models is that even perma-
nent shocks are partially insured in the precautionary-savings incomplete-
markets model and thus affect wealth holdings. Since the impact of these
shocks on asset holdings increases over time, the wealth response to in-
come shocks may increase in the number of periods N , as illustrated in the
examples provided by Krueger and Perri (2011).
If this prediction of the precautionary-savings incomplete-markets mod-
el were robust, it would allow for an easy test of the classic permanent-
income model against the precautionary-savings incomplete-markets model.
Researchers would compute the wealth response to income shocks for a dif-
ferent number of periods N . If the wealth response to income shocks fell
with N in the data, this would be supporting evidence for the permanent-
income model (under the conditions spelled out in Corollary 1) but not
for the precautionary-savings incomplete-markets model. Note that both
models have instead the same qualitative prediction that the consumption
response to income shocks will increase in N .
I want to add to the findings in Krueger and Perri (2011) by providing
an alternative example for the precautionary-savings incomplete-markets
model. Strikingly, in this example the precautionary-savings incomplete-
markets model with liquidity constraints, a = 0, delivers a wealth response
to income shocks which decreases in N . Thus, observing such a wealth
response in the data is not necessarily inconsistent with the financial market
imperfections implied by occasionally binding liquidity constraints.
The first row of Table 2.2 displays the consumption and wealth response
for my example with parameter values ρ = 1, β = 0.91, r = 0.02, α = 1.1,
a = 0 and Q = 0.34 based on the estimates of Jappelli and Pistaferri
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Table 2.2: Consumption and wealth response to income shocks over differ-
ent number of periods
Consumption response Wealth response
βNc β
N
a
Number of years (N) 2 4 6 2 4 6
Coefficients 0.547 0.653 0.713 0.168 0.151 0.131
Coefficients for different quartiles of the wealth distribution
1st quartile 0.628 0.705 0.755 0.103 0.088 0.066
2nd quartile 0.537 0.645 0.711 0.088 0.080 0.071
3rd quartile 0.511 0.626 0.696 0.110 0.091 0.080
4th quartile 0.442 0.575 0.647 0.168 0.139 0.122
Source: Author’s calculation. Notes: Median regression estimates for the
selected samples. The parameter values are ρ = 1, β = 0.91, r = 0.02,
α = 1.1, a = 0 and Q = 0.34.
(2006). The parameter values are plausible where not surprisingly, given
my previous findings in Table 2.1 the permanent (or even very persistent)
income shock gives the model a chance to generate a wealth response to
income shocks which decreases in N .
Figure 2.1 plots the policies as a function of net worth for some selected
income states, together with the stationary distribution of net worth im-
plied by the model.5 Remarkably, the liquidity constraint is binding for
more than 45% of the agents. As will become clear when I present the
data, this incidence of the constraint is not implausible for the sample of
households that I focus on, following Krueger and Perri (2011).
Figure 2.1 raises the question how a wealth response to income shocks
which decreases in N is generated by the model despite the fact that me-
dian net worth is very low at 0.02, and many consumers are at, or close to,
the liquidity constraint. In the simulations, most of these consumers are
5As I am presenting the solution for the model with ρ = 1 the plotted variables are
normalised by the permanent income level.
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Figure 2.1: Policy functions for selected income states and the net worth
distribution. Source: Author’s calculation. Note: All variables are nor-
malised by the level of the permanent income. The parameter values are
ρ = 1, β = 0.91, r = 0.02, α = 1.1, a = 0 and Q = 0.34.
27
in the bottom half of the income distribution. For these income levels the
policy functions are already fairly linear close to the liquidity constraint
since the discount factor β = 0.91 implies a low target level of wealth. Put
differently, most consumers do not save much for precautionary reasons
close to the liquidity constraint for these values of income. Thus, the mo-
tive for precautionary wealth accumulation is not strong enough for these
impatient consumers to dominate the effect of N on the wealth response
predicted by the permanent-income model.
The lower part of Table 2.2 provides supporting evidence showing the
wealth and consumption response across different quartiles of the net worth
distribution. These responses are obtained by adding dummies for each
but the first net worth quartile to the median regression and by interacting
these dummies with the respective changes in income. I assign observations
to a quartile of the net worth distribution at the time when the consumer
makes the first decision over an N period horizon. For example, the income
changes and wealth responses over six years are classified according to the
net worth at the beginning of the period. Table 2.2 shows that the con-
sumption response increases across all quartiles while the wealth response
decreases for consumers in all quartiles of the net worth distribution. Thus,
the precautionary saving for all agents is small.
I provide an example which shows that a wealth response to income
shocks which decreases in N is consistent with financial-market imperfec-
tions in the form of occasionally binding liquidity constraints if the motive
for precautionary wealth accumulation is not too strong. I now elaborate on
this finding and confront the permanent-income model and precautionary-
savings incomplete-markets model more seriously with the data, estimating
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the latter model by a simulated method of moments. In doing so, I target
median and mean net worth which imposes discipline on the incomplete-
markets model, since the amount of precautionary wealth needs to match
the net worth observed in the data.
2.3 Data
Having presented the predictions of the permanent-income and precaution-
ary-savings incomplete-markets model, which I want to confront with data,
in this section I discuss the most important characteristics of the data I
use. Since I follow Krueger and Perri (2011) when constructing my sample,
I refer to Appendix B and their paper for further details.
The Italian Survey of Households Income and Wealth (SHIW) is a
unique panel data set which contains comprehensive information about
household income, consumption and wealth over a long period. Since 1987
the SHIW has a panel dimension covering around 8, 000 households which
form a representative sample of the Italian population (Jappelli and Pista-
ferri (2010)). The survey is conducted every two years with the exception
of a three-year gap between 1995 and 1998.
Krueger and Perri (2011) show that income shocks co-move with shocks
to real estate and business wealth in the SHIW. Thus, I follow their strat-
egy to isolate the effect of income shocks on household behaviour by se-
lecting only those households for my sample which have no members in
self-employment or entrepreneurial activities and which do not own real
estate. Thus, households in the selected sample have less net worth and
income than the average population, as shown in Table B.1 with summary
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statistics in Appendix B. After cleaning the data, as described in Appendix
B, this leaves me with a sample of 554 households for which I observe the
wealth and non-durable consumption responses to after-tax and transfer
labour income changes after two, four and six years in the time period
1987 to 2010. As in Krueger and Perri (2011), I convert the data into
equivalent units per adult using the OECD equivalence scale to control for
differences in household size.6
I also follow Krueger and Perri (2011) by purging changes in after-
tax labour income, consumption and wealth from those changes which are
predictable. I thus regress the observed changes on a quartic polynomial of
the age of the household head, on education, time and regional dummies as
well as the age-education interaction dummies. I then use the residuals of
these regressions as my measure of shocks, where I take into account that
income shocks are measured with error.
Since there are some outliers for observations on wealth in the data, even
after cleaning the data, I report all estimation results for median regressions
which minimise absolute deviations and thus are robust to outliers.
2.4 Results
This section assesses whether calibrated versions of the permanent income
and of the precautionary saving model match the consumption and wealth
responses to income changes in the SHIW data for different values of N .
I reproduce in Table 2.3 Krueger and Perri’s estimate for the 1987-2008
sample. The response of consumption is increasing in N while the wealth
response is decreasing in N .
6The results are robust if I consider the household as a decision unit.
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As noted in the data section, income changes observed by the econo-
metrician are measured with error. I thus allow for measurement errors
in my calibration and derive consumption and wealth responses under the
assumption that the econometrician observes the true income process yt in
Equation (2.3) with error:
y˜t = yt + γt, (2.5)
where γt ∼ N
(
0, σ2γ
)
is a classical measurement error and is assumed to
be i.i.d. over time and uncorrelated with the income shocks εt and ηt.
Table 2.3: Consumption and wealth response to income shocks in the
permanent-income model and in the data.
Results of Krueger and Perri (2011)
Consumption response βNc Wealth response β
N
a
Number of years N 2 4 6 2 4 6
Responses in the
permanent-income model 0.23 0.37 0.47 0.17 0.14 0.12
Responses in the
SHIW data 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.17 0.07 0.09
Source: Krueger and Perri (2011), Table 5. Parameter values: ρ = 1,
r = 0.02, Q = 0.29, M = 0.55.
2.4.1 Permanent-income model
Before calibrating the permanent-income model, I briefly discuss how mea-
surement error affects the theoretical predictions of the model.
Remark 3. If consumers behave according to the permanent-income model
with β(1+r) = 1 and observed income follows the process (2.5), the response
of consumption and wealth to changes in income over N periods is given
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by
βNc =
cov(∆Nct,∆
N y˜t)
var(∆N y˜t)
=
1−ρN
1−ρ
r
1+r−ρQ+
r
1+r
(1−M)(
(ρN−1)2
1−ρ2 +
1−ρN
1−ρ
)
Q+ 2
(2.6)
βNa =
cov(∆Nat+1,∆
N y˜t)
var(∆N y˜t)
=
1−ρN
1+ρ
1
1+r−ρQ+
1
1+r
(1−M)(
(ρN−1)2
1−ρ2 +
1−ρN
1−ρ
)
Q+ 2
. (2.7)
with
Q ≡ σ
2
η
σ2ε + σ
2
γ
and M ≡ σ
2
γ
σ2ε + σ
2
γ
.
Remark 3 makes explicit how the response of consumption and wealth
to observed income changes depends on the relative importance of mea-
surement error M . I summarise the effect of measurement error on the
responses in the following corollary.
Corollary 2. If consumers behave according to the permanent-income mod-
el with β(1+r) = 1 and income shocks are measured with error according to
(2.5), measurement error affects the responses of wealth and consumption
to observed income shocks in the following way:
• The response of wealth to income shocks is reduced more by measure-
ment error than the response of consumption if the interest rate r is
smaller than unity (∂βNa /∂M < ∂β
N
c /∂M < 0).
• The effect of measurement error on the responses, in absolute terms,
decreases in the number of periods N (∂2βNa /∂M∂N > 0,
∂2βNc /∂M∂N > 0).
Measurement error, as the transitory shock, matters more for smaller
N since the measurement error is also independently distributed over time.
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Table 2.4: Persistence and the wealth response to income shocks over dif-
ferent numbers of periods N .
Wealth response βNa
Persistence ρ \ Number of periods N 2 4 6
0.9995 0.174 0.144 0.124
0.995 0.193 0.176 0.164
0.95 0.250 0.263 0.268
0.8 0.268 0.279 0.280
0.2 0.2757 0.2762 0.2762
Source: Author’s calculation. Note: The parameter values are r = 0.02,
Q = 0.29, M = 0.55
Since the consumption response is smaller and the wealth response is larger
if measured over a smaller number of periods N , the stronger attenuation
bias for smaller N affects in different ways the profile of the wealth and
consumption response over the number of periods. Measurement error
reduces and may even reverse the negative sign of ∂βNa /∂N ; the derivative
∂βNa /∂N < 0 becomes smaller in absolute terms and may even become
positive. Measurement error instead increases the positive sign of the effect
of the number of periods on the consumption response.
Table 2.4 shows how measurement error affects the behaviour of the
wealth response as a function ofN compared with Table 2.1 in Section 2.2.1.
For illustration purposes I set Q = 0.29, M = 0.55 as in the calibration of
the permanent income model in Krueger and Perri (2011).
The wealth response to income shocks no longer decreases consistently
in the number of periods N . The wealth response falls in N only for
very high levels of persistence (ρ = 0.9995 or ρ = 0.995) and is nearly
flat (as one would expect) if the shock has low persistence (ρ = 0.2.).
Yet, for intermediate values of ρ = 0.8 or ρ = 0.95 the wealth response
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Table 2.5: Consumption and wealth response to income shocks in the
permanent-income model and in the data.
Consumption response βNc Wealth response β
N
a
Number of years N 2 4 6 2 4 6
Responses in the
permanent-income model 0.23 0.35 0.43 0.17 0.15 0.14
Responses in the
SHIW data 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.17 0.07 0.09
Source: Author’s calculation. Parameter values: ρ = 0.995, r = 0.02,
Q = 0.40, M = 0.60.
increases in N . These results show that, for plausible parameter values, the
permanent-income model can generate a wealth response which decreases in
N , ∂βNa /∂N < 0, only if income shocks are extremely persistent. In other
words, a wealth response to income shocks which decreases in N imposes
tight restrictions on ρ in the permanent-income model with measurement
error. I thus choose a high level of persistence ρ = 0.995 and calibrate
the relative importance of the variance of the persistent shock Q and the
measurement error M in expressions (2.6) and (2.7), following Krueger and
Perri (2011). Namely, I choose Q and M so that the permanent-income
model exactly matches the two-year responses of wealth and consumption
to income shocks (see Appendix C for further details). I do this while
maintaining the assumption β(1 + r) = 1 in the permanent-income model
with r = 0.02 as before.
The model responses are reported in the first row of Table 2.5, and in the
second row Krueger and Perri’s empirical estimates are reproduced. The
model matches the two-period responses of consumption and wealth of the
SHIW exactly for the empirically plausible values M = 0.60 and Q = 0.40.
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Allowing for income persistence in the calibration implies that, for a level
of ρ = 0.995, the profile of the consumption response over different periods
N increases less, and the wealth response decreases less, compared with
the profile in the calibration of Krueger and Perri (2011) with M = 0.55
and Q = 0.29 in the first row of Table 2.3.
Quantitatively, Table 2.5 shows that the permanent-income model pre-
dicts that the consumption response will increase more strongly in N than
in the data, and the wealth response decreases less strongly in N than in
the data for the values of Q and M necessary to match my estimates for
N = 2 in Table 2.5.
One may wonder how the difference between M = 0.60 and Q = 0.40 in
my calibration and the values M = 0.55 and Q = 0.29 in Krueger and Perri
(2011) affects the results of the permanent-income model. If I change only
M relative to Krueger and Perri (2011) so that M = 0.60 and Q = 0.29,
the wealth responses are β2a = 0.17, β
4
a = 0.16, β
6
a = 0.15. This shows
that the higher value for M in my calibration compared with Krueger and
Perri (2011) makes it more difficult for the permanent-income model to
match the wealth response in the data which decreases in N . However,
the higher value of Q compared to Krueger and Perri (2011), which turns
out to be more important for the consumption responses for the considered
parameter values, contributes obtaining a flatter profile of consumption
over time.
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2.4.2 Precautionary-savings incomplete-markets
model
I showed in Section 2.2.2 that an incomplete-markets model with liquidity
constraints may generate the qualitative profile observed in the data of the
way in which consumption and wealth responses to income shocks depend
on N . I now confront the model more seriously with the data to assess
whether the qualitative and quantitative predictions of the precautionary-
savings incomplete-markets model differ from those of the permanent-in-
come model for parameter values for which the model matches the net
worth holdings in the data. This is important since matching the amount
of net worth imposes discipline on the strength of the motive for precau-
tionary wealth accumulation, which is key to the predictions of the model
regarding the wealth response and its dependence on N .
I proceed to structurally estimate a subset of the model parameters
after choosing the other parameters on the basis of external estimates. In
particular, I set Q = 0.34 and the variance of the observed income σ2y = 0.32
based on estimates for the SHIW income data by Jappelli and Pistaferri
(2006) and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) respectively.
I set persistence ρ = 1 because, as I previously showed, a high level
of persistence is required for the model with measurement error to have a
chance to match a wealth response which decreases in N as in the data.
Finally, I set the borrowing limit to a = 0, which is the natural borrowing
limit for the lognormal income process in Equation (2.3).
I then estimate the parameters β, α and the variance of the measure-
ment error σ2γ for which the model generates moments which minimise
the weighted sum of the squared deviations from the following eight data
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moments: the mean and median of net worth, and the responses of con-
sumption and wealth to income shocks over years N = 2, 4, 6, in turn. The
weighting matrix is the variance-covariance matrix of the model moments,
thus taking into account the model’s predictions about the precision with
which the data moments are estimated. The properties of the response to
income shocks receive less weight in assessing the validity of the model if
the model predicts that these properties are less precisely measured in the
data.
For the estimation with the simulated method of moments, I compute
the model solution on the parameter grid β = 1/(1 + δ) ∈ [0.90, 0.98]
with distance 0.0025 between adjacent gridpoints of the discount rate δ,
α ∈ [0.80, 2.8] with distance 0.05 between adjacent gridpoints and σ2γ ∈
[0, 0.0375] with distance 0.0025 between adjacent gridpoints. I then perform
a search for the parameter combination on this grid that minimises the
distance between the model generated moments and the moments obtained
from the SHIW. See Appendix C for further information on the model
solution and estimation.
Table 2.6 reports the estimation results. To facilitate comparison I
report the data moments from the SHIW in the last row of the table.
The model estimates for β, α and σ2γ are reasonable and comparable to
the literature. With respect to the example provided in section 2.2.2, the
discount factor in the estimated model is higher, β = 0.97. Thus, the
households are more patient and thus their target level of wealth is higher
than in the example. Given that Q is calibrated to 0.34 and the variance
of observed income to 0.32, the estimate for the variance of measurement
error σ2γ = 0.02 implies σ
2
η = 0.0124 and σ
2
ε = 0.0168, and thus M =
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0.02/(0.02 + 0.0168) = 0.54. The estimate for M coincides with Krueger
and Perri’s calibration of the permanent income model.
The estimation results in Table 2.6 show that the model essentially
matches the mean net worth, 0.55 compared to 0.59, though slightly over-
estimating the median net worth. While the model predicts the consump-
tion response at N = 2 quite precisely, then it predicts a steeper profile of
responses over time compared with the data. In terms of wealth responses,
the model does an excellent job of predicting the responses at N = 2 and
capturing a decreasing profile over time, though this is not as pronounced
as in the data. Interestingly, the precautionary motive for wealth accumu-
lation, which is required for the model to match the rather low net worth
holdings of the selected sample in the data, is not strong enough to pre-
vent the model from capturing the decreasing profile of the wealth response
across N observed in the data.
The model fails to pass the test for overidentifying restrictions with a
test statistic of 207 where the critical value for rejection at the 1%-level
is χ2(5) = 15.09. Interestingly, the main reason for rejection comes from
the discrepancies predicting the median net worth and the consumption
responses at N = 4 and N = 6, which worsen the performance of the
model. In fact, the wealth responses contribute to the fitting of the model.
The point of Krueger and Perri (2011) is that the wealth responses over time
allow them to reject the precautionary-savings model. In my estimation
what turns out to be true is that the wealth responses over time marginally
contributes to the χ2 statistic by only ten points, adding 3 more degrees of
freedom.
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2.5 Conclusions
Building on the results in Krueger and Perri (2011), I have shown that the
observed response of household wealth to income shocks, which decreases
if measured over a greater number of years, is consistent with the classic
permanent-income model if income shocks are very persistent and income
is not measured with too much error. Then I have provided an example
in which a standard incomplete-markets model with liquidity constraints
generates such a wealth response if the motive for accumulating precau-
tionary wealth is small enough. Thus, it is important that the quantitative
predictions of the incomplete-markets model are evaluated at parameter
values for which this model matches the net worth holdings of the selected
sample of consumers in the data.
My estimation results, obtained by the simulated method of moments,
show that the precautionary saving motive in a model with financial mar-
ket imperfections, disciplined by matching wealth moments, is not strong
enough to revert to the decreasing wealth profile observed in the data. In
sum, the declining wealth response to income shocks over time is not a
strong statistic to consider as evidence against the existence of borrowing
constraints.
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Appendices
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Appendix A
Proofs
Proof. Remark 1: I follow Deaton (1992), Chapter 3, adapting the deriva-
tions to my assumptions about the income process (2.3). The intertemporal
budget constraint
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + r
)s−t
cs = (1 + r)at +
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + r
)s−t
ys
holds for any realization of income and thus also in expectation:
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + r
)s−t
Etcs = (1 + r)at +
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + r
)s−t
Etys. (A.1)
It follows from (2.4), applying the law of iterated expectations, that for
s > t
ct = Etcs,
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so that
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + r
)s−t
Etcs = ct
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + r
)s−t
=
1 + r
r
ct.
Thus (A.1) implies
ct = rat +
r
1 + r
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + r
)s−t
Etys. (A.2)
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Change of consumption over time
Using the lagged budget constraint (2.2) to substitute at, I get
ct = r ((1 + r)at−1 + yt−1 − ct−1) + r
1 + r
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + r
)s−t
Etys. (A.3)
Using (A.2) lagged one period and multiplying by 1 + r yields
(1 + r)ct−1 = r(1 + r)at−1 + (1 + r)
r
1 + r
∞∑
s=t−1
(
1
1 + r
)s−t+1
Et−1ys (A.4)
= r(1 + r)at−1 + ryt−1 +
r
1 + r
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + r
)s−t
Et−1ys.
Subtracting (A.4) from (A.3) I find
∆ct ≡ ct − ct−1 = r
1 + r
{ ∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + r
)s−t
(Etys − Et−1ys)
}
=
r
1 + r
{
εt +
∞∑
s=t
(
ρ
1 + r
)s−t
ηt
}
=
r
1 + r
εt +
r
1 + r − ρηt,
where Etys = ys for s ≤ t and the second equality follows from (2.3).
Change of wealth over time
Substituting (A.2) into the budget constraint, I have
at+1 = (1 + r)at + yt − ct
= at + yt − r
1 + r
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + r
)s−t
Etys.
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Thus,
∆at+1 = yt − r
1 + r
∞∑
s=t
(
1
1 + r
)s−t
Etys
= yt − r
1 + r
yt − r
1 + r
∞∑
s=t+1
(
1
1 + r
)s−t
Etys
=
1
1 + r
(
yt − rρ
1 + r
∞∑
s=t+1
(
ρ
1 + r
)s−t−1
zt
)
,
where Equation (2.3) implies
Etyt+s = ρEtzt+s−1 + Etηt+s + Etεt+s = ρszt.
Expanding, I get
∆at+1 =
1
1 + r
(
yt − rρ
1 + r − ρzt
)
=
εt
1 + r
+
1− ρ
1 + r − ρ (ρzt−1 + ηt) .
Change of income over time
It follows immediately from the assumed income process (2.3) that
∆yt = ∆zt + ∆εt
= (ρ− 1) zt−1 + ηt + ∆εt.
Proof. Remark 2 and 3: I derive results for the general income process
(2.5) with measurement error. The results of Remark 2 are easily obtained
by setting M = 0 in Equations (A.8) and (A.9) below.
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Remark 1 implies that the N -period changes of consumption, wealth
and income are
∆Nct =
t∑
τ=t−N+1
(
r
1 + r
ετ +
r
1 + r − ρητ
)
, (A.5)
∆Nat+1 =
1− ρN
1 + r − ρρzt−N +
t∑
τ=t−N+1
(
ετ
1 + r
+
1− ρt−τ+1
1 + r − ρ ητ
)
, (A.6)
∆N y˜t =
(
ρN − 1) zt−N + t∑
τ=t−N+1
ρt−τητ + ∆Nεt + ∆Nγt . (A.7)
The coefficients of bivariate regressions of N -period consumption or wealth
changes on N -period income changes are thus given by cov(∆Nct,∆
N y˜t)/
var(∆N y˜t) and cov(∆
Nat+1,∆
N y˜t)/var(∆
N y˜t). Equations (A.5), (A.6) and
(A.7) allow us to compute these variance and covariances as
var(∆N y˜t) =
(
(ρN − 1)2
1− ρ2 +
t∑
τ=t−N+1
ρt−τ
)
σ2η + 2σ
2
ε + 2σ
2
γ
=
(
(ρN − 1)2
1− ρ2 +
1− ρN
1− ρ
)
σ2η + 2σ
2
ε + 2σ
2
γ,
cov(∆Nct,∆
N y˜t) =
1− ρN
1− ρ
r
1 + r − ρσ
2
η +
r
1 + r
σ2ε
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and
cov(∆Nat+1,∆
N y˜t) =
(
− ρ(1− ρ
N)2
(1 + r − ρ)(1− ρ2) +
t∑
τ=t−N+1
ρt−τ
1− ρt−τ+1
1 + r − ρ
)
σ2η +
σ2ε
1 + r
=
[
−ρ(1− ρ
N)2
1− ρ2 +
t∑
τ=t−N+1
(
ρt−τ − ρ2(t−τ)+1)] σ2η
1 + r − ρ +
σ2ε
1 + r
=
(
−ρ(1− ρ
N)2
1− ρ2 +
1− ρN
1− ρ −
1− ρ2N
1− ρ2 ρ
)
σ2η
1 + r − ρ +
σ2ε
1 + r
=
1− ρN
1− ρ2
1− ρ
1 + r − ρσ
2
η +
σ2ε
1 + r
=
=
1− ρN
1 + ρ
σ2η
1 + r − ρ +
σ2ε
1 + r
.
Using the definitions Q ≡ σ2η/(σ2ε + σ2γ) and M ≡ σ2γ/(σ2ε + σ2γ),
βNc =
cov(∆Nct,∆
N y˜t)
var(∆N y˜t)
= r
1
1−ρ
1−ρN
1+r−ρσ
2
η +
1
1+r
σ2ε(
(ρN−1)2
1−ρ2 +
1−ρN
1−ρ
)
σ2η + 2σ
2
ε + 2σ
2
γ
= r
1
1−ρ
1−ρN
1+r−ρQ+
1
1+r
(1−M)(
(ρN−1)2
1−ρ2 +
1−ρN
1−ρ
)
Q+ 2
(A.8)
= r
1
1−ρA(ρ,N) +
1
1+r
(1−M)
B(ρ,N)
and
βNa =
cov(∆Nat+1,∆
N y˜t)
var(∆N y˜t)
=
1−ρN
1+ρ
σ2η
1+r−ρ +
1
1+r
σ2ε(
(ρN−1)2
1−ρ2 +
1−ρN
1−ρ
)
σ2η + 2σ
2
ε + 2σ
2
γ
=
1
1+ρ
1−ρN
1+r−ρQ+
1
1+r
(1−M)(
(ρN−1)2
1−ρ2 +
1−ρN
1−ρ
)
Q+ 2
(A.9)
=
1
1+ρ
A(ρ,N) + 1
1+r
(1−M)
B(ρ,N)
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with
A(ρ,N) ≡ 1− ρ
N
1 + r − ρQ and B(ρ,N) ≡
(
(ρN − 1)2
1− ρ2 +
1− ρN
1− ρ
)
Q+ 2.
Proof. Corollary 1: I derive the results for the general case with mea-
surement error where the results of Corollary 1 are easily obtained setting
M = 0.
It follows from Remark 3 that
∂βNa
∂N
=
1
1+ρ
∂A(ρ,N)
∂N
B(ρ,N)− ∂B(ρ,N)
∂N
(
1
1+ρ
A(ρ,N) + 1
1+r
(1−M)
)
B(ρ,N)2
(A.10)
and
∂βNc
∂N
= r
1
1−ρ
∂A(ρ,N)
∂N
B(ρ,N)− ∂B(ρ,N)
∂N
(
1
1−ρA(ρ,N) +
1
1+r
(1−M)
)
B(ρ,N)2
.
(A.11)
The sign of ∂βNa /∂N and ∂β
N
c /∂N depends on the sign of the respective
numerator in (A.10) and (A.11):
sign
(
∂βNa
∂N
)
=
1
1 + ρ
sign
[
∂A(ρ,N)
∂N
B(ρ,N)− ∂B(ρ,N)
∂N
(
A(ρ,N) +
1 + ρ
1 + r
(1−M)
)]
and
sign
(
∂βNc
∂N
)
=
1
1− ρsign
[
∂A(ρ,N)
∂N
B(ρ,N)− ∂B(ρ,N)
∂N
(
A(ρ,N) +
1− ρ
1 + r
(1−M)
)]
.
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Note that
∂A(ρ,N)
∂N
=
−
ρN ln ρ
1+r−ρQ > 0 if 0 < ρ < 1 and Q > 0
0 if ρ = 0 or ρ = 1.
and
∂B(ρ,N)
∂N
=

ρN ln ρ
1−ρ
(
2(ρN−1)
1+ρ
− 1
)
Q > 0 if 0 < ρ < 1 and Q > 0
0 if ρ = 0
Q > 0 if ρ = 1 and Q > 0,
where L’Hoˆpital’s rule implies B(1, N) = NQ+ 2.
The consumption response as a function of N
Substituting in the expressions for A(ρ,N), B(ρ,N), and their respec-
tive derivatives with respect to N ,
sign
(
∂βNc
∂N
)
=
1
1− ρ sign
[
− ρ
N ln ρ
1 + r − ρQ
((
(ρN − 1)2
1− ρ2 +
1− ρN
1− ρ
)
Q+ 2
)
−ρ
N ln ρ
1− ρ
(
2(ρN − 1)
1 + ρ
− 1
)
Q
(
1− ρN
1 + r − ρQ+
1− ρ
1 + r
(1−M)
)]
=
1
1− ρ sign
[
− ρ
N ln ρ
(1− ρ2) (1 + r − ρ)Q
(
2(1− ρ2)−Q (ρN − 1)2)
−ρ
N ln ρ
1 + r
(
2(ρN − 1)
1 + ρ
− 1
)
Q(1−M)
]
=
1
1− ρ sign
[
− ρ
N ln ρ
(1− ρ2) (1 + r − ρ)Q×(
2(1− ρ2)− (1− ρ
2) (1 + r − ρ)
1 + r
(
2(1− ρN)
1 + ρ
+ 1
)
−Q (ρN − 1)2)
−ρ
N ln ρ
1 + r
(
2(1− ρN)
1 + ρ
+ 1
)
QM)
]
For 0 < ρ < 1, the second term in square brackets is positive for 0 < M ≤ 1.
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The first term is positive if Q is sufficiently small so that
2(1− ρ2)− (1− ρ
2) (1 + r − ρ)
1 + r
(
2(1− ρN)
1 + ρ
+ 1
)
−Q (ρN − 1)2 > 0
or
Q <
2(1− ρ2)− (1−ρ
2)(1+r−ρ)
1+r
(
2(1−ρN )
1+ρ
+ 1
)
(ρN − 1)2 ≡ Q
∗
c .
Note that Q∗c ≥ 0 only for ρ > 0.
Let us now consider two special cases. If σ2ε = 0 and σ
2
γ = 0 so that
Q =∞,
βNc = r
1 + ρ
(2 + ρ− ρN) (1 + r − ρ)
which is decreasing in N for 0 < ρ < 1, constant at 1/(1 + r) for ρ = 0 and
constant at zero for ρ = 1.
If ρ = 1,
βNc =
NQ+ r
1+r
(1−M)
NQ+ 2
,
so that
∂βNc
∂N
=
NQ2 + 2Q−NQ2 − r
1+r
(1−M)Q
(NQ+ 2)2
=
2Q− r
1+r
(1−M)Q
(NQ+ 2)2
.
Since 0 ≤ M ≤ 1, the consumption response depends positively on N if
σ2ε > 0 and σ
2
η > 0 so that 0 < Q <∞.
The wealth response as a function of N
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I have
sign
(
∂βNa
∂N
)
=
1
1 + ρ
sign
[
− ρ
N ln ρ
1 + r − ρQ
((
(ρN − 1)2
1− ρ2 +
1− ρN
1− ρ
)
Q+ 2
)
−ρ
N ln ρ
1− ρ
(
2(ρN − 1)
1 + ρ
− 1
)
Q
(
1− ρN
1 + r − ρQ+
1 + ρ
1 + r
(1−M)
)]
=
1
1 + ρ
sign
[
− ρ
N ln ρ
(1− ρ2) (1 + r − ρ)Q
(
2(1− ρ2)−Q (ρN − 1)2)
−ρ
N ln ρ
1 + r
1 + ρ
1− ρ
(
2(ρN − 1)
1 + ρ
− 1
)
Q(1−M)
]
=
1
1 + ρ
sign
[
− ρ
N ln ρ
(1− ρ2) (1 + r − ρ)Q×(
2(1− ρ2)− (1 + ρ)
2 (1 + r − ρ)
1 + r
(
2(1− ρN)
1 + ρ
+ 1
)
−Q (ρN − 1)2)
−ρ
N ln ρ
1 + r
1 + ρ
1− ρ
(
2(1− ρN)
1 + ρ
+ 1
)
QM
]
For 0 < ρ < 1, the second term in square brackets is positive for 0 < M ≤ 1.
The first term is negative if Q is sufficiently large so that
2(1− ρ2)− (1 + ρ)
2 (1 + r − ρ)
1 + r
(
2(1− ρN)
1 + ρ
+ 1
)
−Q (ρN − 1)2 < 0
or
Q >
2(1− ρ2)− (1+ρ)2(1+r−ρ)
1+r
(
2(1−ρN )
1+ρ
+ 1
)
(ρN − 1)2 ≡ Q
∗
a.
Note that Q∗a < Q
∗
c for 0 < ρ < 1, so that there exists Q ∈ [Q∗a;Q∗c ] for
which the wealth response negatively depends on N while the consumption
response positively depends on N .
Let us now consider again two special cases. If σ2ε = 0 and σ
2
γ = 0 so
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that Q =∞,
βNa =
1− ρ
(2 + ρ− ρN) (1 + r − ρ) ,
which decreases in N for 0 < ρ < 1, constant at 1/(1 + r) for ρ = 0 and
constant at zero for ρ = 1.
If ρ = 1,
βNa =
1
1 + r
1−M
NQ+ 2
which is unambiguously decreasing in N for 0 < Q <∞.
Proof. Corollary 2:
Using the results of Remark 2, I find that the effect of measurement
error on the wealth and consumption response is
∂βNa
∂M
= −
1
1+r
B(ρ,N)
and
∂βNc
∂M
= r
∂βNa
∂M
so that ∂βNa /∂M < ∂β
N
c /∂M < 0 for −1 < r < 1. The effect of measure-
ment error on the responses of wealth and consumption increases in the
number of periods N since
∂2βNa
∂M∂N
=
1
1+r
∂B(ρ,N)
∂N
B(ρ,N)2
> 0.
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where the inequality follows from ∂B(ρ,N)/∂N > 0 for 0 < ρ ≤ 1, as
established in Corollary 1.
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Appendix B
Data appendix
The variables used in the analysis are defined as follows:
Non-durable consumption: all expenditures but for expenditures on
transport equipment, valuables, household equipment, home improvement,
insurance premia and contributions to pension funds. The measure includes
the effectively paid or the imputed rent.
After-tax labour income: after-tax wages and salaries, fringe benefits
and transfers (pensions, arrears and other transfers).
Net-financial assets: sum of deposits, checked deposits, repos, postal
savings certificates, government securities and other securities (bonds, mu-
tual funds, equity, shares in private limited companies and partnerships,
foreign securities, loans to cooperatives) net of financial liabilities (liabil-
ities to banks and financial companies, trade debt and liabilities to other
households).
Education: the categories are elementary school, middle school, high
school, college degree and postgraduate education.
Regions: the regions are Northern, Centre and Southern regions (in-
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Table B.1: Summary statistics for the SHIW sample of households with
a head aged 25-55 observed in at least two consecutive waves, and the
selected sample of these households without real estate wealth and without
members in self-employment or entrepreneurial activities.
Variables Sample of households Selected sample
(aged 25-55 (not
and with obs. self-employed,
in consecutive waves) no real estate)
Age of household head 43.4 41.5
(7.691) (8.102)
Household size 3.42 3.28
(1.247) (1.356)
Labour earnings (after tax/transfer) 9,747 8,063
(6,687) (4,892)
Standard deviation of - -
residual earnings: 2-period change - (1,251.5)
Standard deviation of - -
residual earnings: 4-period change - (506.2)
Standard deviation of - -
residual earnings: 6-period change - (436.8)
Net worth 57,774 5,614
(67,092) (14,197)
Non-durable consumption 8,229 6,818
(4,314) (3,525)
Education: none 0.01 0.02
(0.108) (0.132)
Education: elementary school 0.17 0.21
(0.375) (0.408)
Education: middle school 0.36 0.42
(0.481) (0.494)
Education: high school 0.35 0.29
(0.478) (0.454)
Education: college degree 0.10 0.06
(0.296) (0.230)
Education: postgraduate education 0.004 0.002
(0.063) (0.043)
Region: North 0.42 0.43
(0.494) (0.495)
Region: Center 0.20 0.16
(0.396) (0.363)
Region: South (incl. islands) 0.38 0.41
(0.486) (0.492)
Sources: Author’s calculation based on SHIW data 1987-2008. Note: Stan-
dard deviation in brackets. Monetary variables are converted to Euro in
2000 and expressed in adult equivalent units. Labour earnings include in-
come from self-employment for the sample of households with a head aged
25-55 and observed in at least two consecutive waves.
cluding islands), individually.
Sample construction:
The SHIW data between 1987 and 2008 include 87,629 observations for
54,070 households. I convert all nominal variables so that their unit is the
Euro in the year 2000. I clean the sample of those households that report
zero food consumption (dropping 24 observations). As Krueger and Perri
(2011) I construct the sample with households which appear in consecutive
waves (resulting in 43,482 observations). I select the prime-age house-
holds whose head is between 25 and 55 years old (21,835 observations) and
whose members are not in self-employment or employed in entrepreneurial
activities (16,796 observations) and which do not own real estate (5,487
observations for 2,515 households). Table B.1 provides summary statistics
for the full cleaned sample and the selected sample of households without
real estate or members in self-employment or entrepreneurial activities.
Following Krueger and Perri (2011) I construct measures for shocks
to labour income, consumption and net worth by purging the changes in
after-tax and transfer labour income observed in the data from the changes
which are predictable. I thus regress the respective observed changes on a
quartic polynomial of the age of the household head, on education, time
and regional dummies as well as the age-education interaction dummies. I
then use the residuals of these regressions as my measure of shocks, where
I take into account that income shocks are measured with error. These
changes of variables are annualised because the SHIW is a biannual survey
with the exception of the three-year difference between the wave of 1995
and 1998.
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I then select the households for which I observe at least the second,
fourth and sixth difference of income. This leaves me with a sample of 554
households.
57
Appendix C
Calibration and model
estimation
Calibration of M and Q in the permanent income model
The equations of Remark 3 imply that
M = 1 +
1− ρN
1− ρ
1 + r
1 + r − ρQ−
(
(ρN − 1)2
1− ρ2 +
1− ρN
1− ρ
)
1 + r
r
QβNc −
1 + r
r
2βNc ,
Q = 2
βNc
r
− βNa
2 ρ
1−ρ2
1−ρN
1+r−ρ −
(
(ρN−1)2
1−ρ2 +
1−ρN
1−ρ
)(
βNc
r
− βNa
) .
For ρ = 1, applying L’Hoˆpital’s rule so that lim
ρ→1
1−ρN
1−ρ = N , limρ→1
(ρN−1)2
1−ρ2 = 0,
lim
ρ→1
1−ρN
1−ρ2 = N/2,
M = 1 +
1 + r
r
NQ− 1 + r
r
(NQ+ 2) βNc ,
Q =
2
N
βNc − rβNa
1− βNc + rβNa
.
I set N = 2 to match the two-period responses of consumption and wealth
to income shocks.
58
Solution and estimation of the incomplete-markets model
The solution and estimations follow Hintermaier and Koeniger (2011) so
that I mention only computational issues which are not discussed in their
paper. I discretise the permanent ηt and transitory shock εt with the
quadrature method using 12 points. The grid for the assets is triple-
exponential with 1,600 points (adding 25 extra points where the policies
have more curvature). I employ the endogenous-grid method (EGM) pro-
posed by Carroll (2006) to solve the model.
I simulate the model economy for 45 periods for 25,000 consumers,
drawing both the transitory and the permanent shock with the normal
random number generator and interpolating the policy functions to obtain
consumption and savings for the simulated values of income and net worth.
I drop the first 1,000 periods and then use the remaining observations as my
simulated data set for the stationary distribution. I estimate the response
of consumption and wealth to income changes following the same steps as
for the SHIW data (described in the data appendix).
In order to determine for which parameter values the incomplete mar-
kets model minimises the distance to the data moments, I estimate the
model using the simulated methods of moments. This is implemented in a
standard fashion so that I refer to the detailed description of Hintermaier
and Koeniger (2011) for brevity. To compute the variance-covariance ma-
trix I draw, with replacement, 10,000 random samples of size 554, the sam-
ple size of the data set constructed from the SHIW. I compute the data
moments for each of these finite samples and their variance/covariance
across the 10,000 samples.
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Chapter 3
Do financial market
imperfections matter for
household behaviour?
Evidence from Chile, Spain
and the United States
3.1 Introduction
Using the framework from the previous chapter, I empirically study what
can be learned from the international evidence with respect to households’
reaction to income shocks and the influence of financial market imperfec-
tions on their behaviour, represented by the existence of a borrowing limit.
The international evidence on this topic raises an interesting issue,
which is enhanced when the data availability is considered. I obtain a
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panel data on income, consumption and wealth for an heterogeneous set
of countries. First, I have data for the United States, the most developed
country in terms of financial markets. Second, I have Spain, a European de-
veloped country which is comparable to Italy. Finally, I have a developing
country, Chile, which presents less developed financial markets.
It is an interesting set of countries because financial markets there have
developed differently in the US from Spain and Chile. A priori, I expect
that the additional variation from the different level of development will
imply different results across these three countries. In addition, it permits
me to check the robustness of the results for Italy presented in Chapter 2.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first research that structurally
estimates a standard precautionary-savings incomplete-markets model for
countries such as Chile and Spain. Hence, this is the first attempt to
exploit two relatively new and rich panel data surveys and try to understand
empirically how relevant borrowing constraints are for a particular set of
households from these economies, and also to compare the results with
those of United States and the ones for Italy presented in Chapter 2.
I summarise the empirical answers to the question of how households
respond to income shocks and how important are borrowing constraints
derived from what I can learn from the data and from the model. First, in
analysing how household consumption and saving react to income shocks
I find evidence from the three countries to suggest that the financial mar-
ket imperfections are not very important. Second, I structurally estimate
a standard precautionary-saving incomplete-markets model for the three
countries, disciplining it by matching net worth moments, mean and me-
dian, which limits the quantitative importance of precautionary savings.
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As in Chapter 2, the model is able to replicate the observed downward
sloping wealth profile to income shocks over time. I find that the standard
model has difficulties in exactly matching some features of the net worth
distribution and that it overestimates the consumption responses to income
shocks. In fact the contribution of the predicted saving behaviour is the
most important factor in the model fitting. The target of level of wealth
is low for the sub-samples considered. The model matches this with a low
level of risk aversion and high or moderate levels of impatience.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 briefly recalls
the model I introduced in Chapter 2. Section 3.3 describes the data sources
used for each country, with their peculiarities. Section 3.4 presents and
discusses the estimation results. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The Model
As in Chapter 2, the model is based on the standard income fluctuation
problem. Households have an infinite horizon; they derive utility from
consumption ct and discount the future with factor β. In each period
t they receive labour income yt and interest r from a one-period asset.
With these sources of income they decide how much to consume ct and the
amount of assets to hold for the next period at+1. Households are subject
to a borrowing limit at+1 ≥ a. I am considering a small open economy so
that the interest rate is exogenous.
I repeat in the following equations the recursive form of the household
problem where, compared to the previous chapter, I include the borrowing
constraint (Equation 3.3).
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v(at, yt) = max
at+1
u((1 + r)at + yt − at+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
ct
) + βEtv(at+1, yt+1)
 (3.1)
subject to
at+1 + ct = (1 + r)at + yt, (3.2)
at+1 ≥ a, (3.3)
lim
T→∞
(
1
1 + r
)T
aT+1 = 0 a.s.,
where the No-Ponzi-Game condition ensures that the intertemporal budget
constraint holds with equality.
The problem has two state variables: the endogenous asset position
at and the exogenous stochastic income yt which matters for expectations
due to the persistence of income shocks. The consumer’s stochastic labour
income yt follows the process
yt = zt + εt, (3.4)
zt = ρzt−1 + ηt,
where εt ∼ N (0, σ2ε) is a transitory income shock and ηt ∼ N
(
0, σ2η
)
is an
income shock with persistence 0 < ρ < 1. The shocks εt and ηt are assumed
to be uncorrelated with each other in every period t and i.i.d. over time.
As in Chapter 2, I assume that income is observed with measurement
error by the econometrician. The income process observed in the data is:
y˜t = yt + γt, (3.5)
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where γt ∼ N
(
0, σ2γ
)
is classical measurement error and is assumed to be
i.i.d. over time and uncorrelated with the income shocks εt and ηt.
The measurement error is estimated in the model with the commonly as-
sumed utility function CRRA. Under these preferences the precautionary-
savings incomplete-markets model does not have a closed form solution.1
Solvency in this model implies a borrowing constraint at+1 ≥a which
I set as the natural borrowing limit introduced by Aiyagari (1994). The
existence of this occasionally binding borrowing constraint results in a pre-
cautionary saving motive which, for the commonly assumed CRRA utility
function, becomes less strong when the agent is wealthier. Indeed, as I ex-
plained previously, there are situations where the predictions of this model
are identical to those of the classic permanent-income model.2 This is trivial
if the agent has abundant net worth relative to the borrowing limit a so that
the constraint is binding with probability close to zero. More interestingly,
the behaviour of the agent is characterised well by a permanent-income
model if the agent has a very low target level of wealth. In this case the
precautionary saving motive is very low, even when the agent is close to
being constrained. A numerical example is presented in Chapter 2.
3.3 Data Description
From an empirical perspective, it is demanding to take the model to the
data since this requires information on all the components of a household’s
budget constraint (3.2). The ideal dataset would consist of households
1On Appendix C of Chapter 2 I provide details and references on ways to solve and
simulate this standard model.
2I refer the interested reader to the first chapter, where I present more details about
predictions of the precautionary-savings incomplete-markets model and insightful com-
parisons with the permanent income hypothesis model.
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panel data with a long time dimension and with detailed information on
after-tax labour income, non-durable consumption and wealth holdings.
Data sources with information on all the relevant components of the
household budget constraint are scarce. In addition to the survey con-
ducted by the Bank of Italy, which I use in the first chapter, I have identified
three other accessible surveys: the Encuesta de Proteccio´n Social (EPS) for
Chile, the Encuesta Financiera de las Familias (EFF) for Spain and the
Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the United States. 3
I follow the strategy of the first chapter for sample selection and exclude
from the sample households with self-employed or business activities and
with real estate. As Krueger and Perri (2011) show, income shocks co-move
with real estate and business wealth. Thus, the response to income shocks
is not well measured for households with real estate wealth.
To estimate the household behaviour in terms of consumption and sav-
ing, I first purge the series from any predictable changes. Then I use the
changes in the residuals of those regressions as the shocks to estimate the
responses of consumption and wealth over time.
Chile
The Encuesta de Proteccio´n Social (EPS, Social Protection Survey) is the
first microeconomic panel data for Chile. The first wave is from 2002 and
further waves exist for 2004, 2006 and 2009. The first wave represented
3In April 2013 the first wave of the Eurosystem’s Household Finance and Consump-
tion Survey was released. This will be a great data source for my purposes when more
waves have become available in the future. Other existing panel data could be con-
structed using administrative records for Denmark, Finland and Norway, but the ac-
cess is restricted. Finally there is the Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS) which has
harmonised micro-data at a household level for several countries but only with a cross-
sectional dimension.
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only the population affiliated with the pension system but the waves from
2004 onwards consider the whole Chilean population. The survey provides
information on the labour and pension history of household members and
their demographic characteristics, such as age, gender and other charac-
teristics presented in Appendix E, education levels, health, transfers and
wealth in particular.4
The EPS has some limitations worth pointing out. Compared to the
other surveys used in this research, the EPS is not a financial survey by
design (as is the SHIW for Italy or the EFF for Spain) although it provides
information about households’ asset holdings and debts for the last three
waves (the financial module has been included since 2004). As I explain in
Appendix G, this matters for the external estimates that I use as inputs in
the model.
A further issue is that the Chilean pension system was reformed in 2008.
Although this may have affected survey answers in the 2009 wave, feeding
these changes into the structural model is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Spain
The Central Bank of Spain manages the Encuesta Financiera de las Fa-
milias (EFF, Survey of Household Finances) since 2002. It is a survey
conducted every 3 years, where the last available wave corresponds to the
year 2008. From the second wave onwards, the survey has had a panel com-
ponent. The survey has detailed information on the income, consumption,
wealth holdings and debts of the families.
4For more details about sample design, questionnaires and other methodological as-
pects see “Encuesta de Proteccio´n Social 2002-2009, Documento Metodolo´gico” available
from http://www.previsionsocial.gob.cl/subprev/?wpfb_dl=158.
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For this research purposes the Spanish data’s main disadvantage is its
sample size, which results from two characteristics. First, the size of the
panel component of the EFF constrains my selected sample: the 2008 wave
has 6, 197 observations of which 1, 925 come from interviews in 2002. Sec-
ond, Spain is one of the countries that has the highest home ownership
rates. According to the EFF survey 80% of households own their main
residence.5 Labour income is reported gross, not after tax. I describe
in Appendix E how I calibrate the labour income process for net income
in Spain. Finally, unlike the other datasets, this one contains no region
information and the place of birth is not reported in the survey.
Due to the small size of the total sample, the criteria for selecting the
sample are imposed on the households only in the year 2002. The difference
from the other countries is that in the subsequent waves some character-
istics could change as a result of the households’ responses to the shocks.
With this approach the balanced panel sample size is 88 households instead
of 42.
United States
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) started in 1968 and thus has
the longest time dimension of any household panel survey. It is conducted
by the Survey Research Center of the Institute for Social Research at the
University of Michigan. This dataset includes information on earnings,
consumption and wealth at the household level. Originally the survey was
conducted every year, but since 1998 information has been collected only
every other year.
5The percentage of households which rent or have free use of their residence in the
EFF is 14.4%.
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I consider the 7 waves between 1998 and 2010, because these waves in-
clude detailed information on the household’s asset holdings and a broader
measure of consumption (which has been further extended since 2004). See
Appendix E for further details about the variable definitions used for this
research.
I use the data between 1998 and 2010 to calibrate an income process for
the sub-sample considered in this research and the last 4 waves to exploit
the extended consumption information and estimate household behaviour.
Since the PSID reports labour income before tax, I update the Stata codes
for the TAXSIM model developed by Feenberg and Coutts (1993) to obtain
each household’s labour income net of taxes.6
Since the time period for which data are available for each country
constitutes another source of heterogeneity, I provide information about
the macroeconomic environment for each country in Appendix D.
3.3.1 Selected sample
I apply the same sample selection procedure for the three countries con-
sidered (except for the modifications due to the small sample size in Spain
mentioned above). I present in Appendix E more details on the steps taken
to construct the sample and variables for each country . To summarise, I
select the households which are renting, whose head is between 25 and 55
years old, non-retired and which does not have other real estate properties
or any business. To exploit the panel dimension of the data I focus on the
households which appear consecutively in all the available waves for Chile
and Spain and for the United States for the time period considered.
6The Stata codes for the PSID can be downloaded from the NBER website http:
//users.nber.org/~taxsim/ and were developed by Eric Zwick.
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In Table 3.1 I present the summary statistics for the selected samples of
the three countries. The monetary variables correspond to adult equivalent
units and are expressed in 2010 dollars.
Note first that the Spanish figures differ from those of the other countries
because I also relax the sample selection criteria to increase the number of
observations. In particular, I include households which can own real estate,
or become self-employed, or have businesses, from the second or third wave
in which they are observed. This explains the higher age of the head and
the greater net worth values that the households hold. If I consider in all
the years those households which are renting or freely using their residence
(as in the other samples), there are only 69 Spanish observations in the
three waves. In this case the age of the average households’ head is 42.0
years and the average net worth is 11, 260.5 dollars of 2010, figures that
are closer to those observed for the other countries.
Second, Chilean statistics for income, consumption and wealth are lower
than those in the other countries. While Chile is a developing economy,
this is also due to the bigger average household size. Households in Chile
are almost twice the size of households in Spain and the United States,
which affects the figures in adult equivalent units.
Table 3.1 shows that the selected sub-samples correspond to middle-
aged households which are slightly younger than the whole sample popu-
lation (Chile 46.9, Spain 59.3 and United States 44.6), and with similar
numbers of household members as in their sample population (Chile 4.9,
Spain 2.8 and the United States 2.8). I report in the table the labour earn-
ings for the head and spouse in the household. Compared with the averages
for the whole sample, the earnings for Chile and Spain are similar ( 6.6%
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics for the selected samples
Chile Spain United States
Age of household head 39.3 52.2 39.0
( 6.916) ( 14.258) ( 7.582)
Household size 5.1 2.8 2.8
( 2.105) ( 1.461) ( 1.639)
Labour earnings 2,360.3 8,487.2 19,727.6
( 2,895.6) ( 11,620.9) ( 19,278.5)
Labour earnings plus transfers 2,408.0 14,578.9 20,185.3
( 2,342.3) ( 10,777.2) ( 14,020.6)
Non Durable consumption 1,694.9 7,526.5 6,192.4
( 1,742.0) ( 4,547.8) ( 3,446.8)
Net worth -110.1 22,079.6 9,273.0
( 1,569.3) ( 66,260.2) ( 163,977.7)
Observations 702 264 1,520
Source: Author’s calculations. Note: Monetary variables are in 2010 dol-
lars. I use the OECD equivalence scale to convert the data into adult
equivalent units. The results are robust if I consider the household as the
unit of analysis. Labour earnings correspond to the head and spouse of the
household. Standard errors in parentheses.
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and 8.3% higher than the averages for the whole sample). The selected
American households have 34.3% lower labour income than the mean for
the PSID households in the years under review.
The size of the transfers are most important for Spain. The transfers
for all three countries reduce the observed inequality.
Finally, the differences between the economies are manifested most
clearly in terms of wealth. The households in the selected sample for Chile
have no net worth, while net worth is highest in Spain, because some house-
holds own real estate in the second or third wave. Chilean households with
mean net worth are in the second decile of the EPS net worth distribution,
the selected Spanish households are in the fifth decile of the EFF and the
American households in the sixth decile of the PSID net worth distribution.
3.3.2 Empirical evidence
The objective is to obtain estimates of the way in which household con-
sumption and saving behaviour respond to unpredictable changes of income
over time.
The first step is to obtain the shock components of the variables of
interest by removing any deterministic predictability. To do so I regress the
income, consumption and wealth of the households on a set of observables:
demographic variables of the head of the household (a quartic polynomial
of the age, education level, gender and interactions between education and
age) and time and regional variables. When available, more information
on the set of regressors and the construction of the shocks is provided in
Appendix F.
Next I use these residual series to construct changes of consumption,
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income and wealth over N period horizons. Due to the different periodicity
and availability between the three considered surveys, the time horizons
for each country are different. For Chile I construct two and five year
differences, for Spain three and six year differences and for the United
States two, four and six year differences.
I regress these residual changes in consumption and wealth for different
time periods on the corresponding residual changes of income to see how
consumption and savings react to income shocks over time. I present the
estimates in Table (3.2). For robustness to outliers I report the results of
median regressions.
Table 3.2: Consumption and wealth response to income shocks in the data
N
Consumption Wealth Wealth
Sample size
βc βa Mean Median
Chile 2 0.136 0.013 -0.096 0.000 234
(0.031) (0.009)
5 0.332 0.003
(0.033) (0.013)
Spain 3 0.127 0.459 1.390 0.798 88
(0.068) (0.292)
6 0.186 0.123
(0.071) (0.310)
USA 2 0.068 0.164 0.482 0.038 380
(0.029) (0.058)
4 0.092 0.131
(0.023) (0.066)
6 0.184 0.159
(0.020) (0.091)
Source: Author’s calculation. Note: Median regression estimates. βc (βa)
are regression coefficients of the N-period changes in consumption (wealth)
over N-period changes in observed income. Standard errors in parentheses.
The model estimates reported in the table correspond to changes of
the variables specified in levels. Thus the coefficients show how changes
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in consumption or wealth react to a one monetary unit change of income.
Table 3.2 shows that the consumption responses have an increasing profile
in N for all countries with all the estimates being significantly different from
zero (only the coefficient for Spain at N = 3 comes close to being rejected
with a p− value of 6.5%). The non-durable consumption profile over time
for Chile is the steepest and the 6 year responses are similar between Spain
and the United States. However, when we consider the estimated wealth
responses the situation is different. First, the wealth profiles are more
noisily estimated; for instance, only the responses at N = 2 and N = 4
for the United States are significantly different from zero. Second, wealth
responses are qualitatively different across countries: the wealth profile over
time decreases markedly for Spain and seems flat for the US and Chile.
In spite of the sample for the three countries being constructed as con-
sistently as the data allow, the final selected samples show substantial het-
erogeneity across countries. The wealth distribution is very different, ex-
hibiting high levels of debt in Chile where half the sample is indebted, a very
skewed distribution in the US with a mean-median ratio of 12.7, and rela-
tive wealthy households in Spain. Replicating these different net worth dis-
tributions will represent a challenge for the standard precautionary-saving
incomplete-markets model in the next section.
3.4 Results
In this section I present the estimates of a precautionary-savings incom-
plete-markets model for the countries considered. The objective is to assess
if this model can match the consumption and wealth responses to income
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shocks replicating at the same time the observed mean and median of the
wealth distribution.
3.4.1 Estimation method
I apply the simulated methods of moments to estimate the discount factor
β, the coefficient of risk aversion α, and the variance of the measurement
error σ2γ for all three countries. In addition, for Chile I estimate the levels
of transfers Tr.
I need to select some parameters and to do so I use external estimates
coming from different data sources. I set outside the model Q and the
variance of observed income σ2y . I detail below the sources and the strategy
for calibrating these parameters.
I simulate the model for 45 periods. I am considering a small-open
economy so I set the interest rate r = 0.02.
I solve the model for ρ = 1 which allows the normalization of all vari-
ables by permanent income in the recursive formulation to reduce the num-
ber of state variables and simplify the model solution. As discussed in the
previous chapter, the main insights do not change if I consider ρ = 1 in-
stead of values of ρ very close to unity and, moreover, the non-increasing
wealth profile estimated in the data suggests that shocks are permanent or
with high levels of persistence.
The income process calibration is key to determining the model’s re-
sults. As explained above, I allow for the presence of measurement error
(γ) for income. Given the variance of measurement error (σ2γ), I calibrate
the variance of permanent (σ2η) and transitory shocks (σ
2
ε) to match the
observed residual variance of household income (σy
2) and the ratio Q of
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permanent shocks over the temporary components (transitory shocks plus
measurement error). I present more details about the income process cali-
bration in Appendix G.
I am disciplining the model to generate the variance in the income pro-
cess observed in the data. For this external estimate I consider the residual
household earnings variance from a regression of a log-earnings measure
over deterministic observables which are consistent with a structural equa-
tion of labour income that is used in the literature. For Chile and the
United States I estimate the corresponding variances.7 In the case of Spain
I use the average residual variance of net household earnings estimated by
Pijoan-Mas and Sanchez-Marcos (2010). The authors use the Encuesta
Continua de Presupuestos Familiares (ECPF, Household expenditure sur-
vey) between 1985 and 1996.
The other parameter that I need to calibrate the income process is Q,
which is the ratio of the variance of permanent shocks to the sum of the
variances of the transitory shocks and the measurement error. The best
inputs for constructing a measure of Q would come from estimating an
income process decomposition in the permanent and transitory components
for the data used. This is only possible for the United States, for which I
estimate a Q = 0.6511. For the two other countries there are not enough
waves to decompose the income process. In the case of Chile I calibrate
Q = 0.4991 by re-scaling the estimates from Huneeus and Repetto (2005).
The authors use a different survey: Encuesta Suplementaria de Ingresos
(ESI, Supplement income survey) which was run between 1990 and 2000
and construct a synthetic panel to estimate the income decomposition. For
7I discuss the estimation procedure in Appendix F.
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Spain I calibrate Q = 0.6762 following Pijoan-Mas and Sanchez-Marcos
(2010) and using an average of the estimates from the ECPF.
I present a summary of the external estimates that I use in the estima-
tion in Table 3.3 and provide more details about the income calibration in
Appendix G.
Table 3.3: External estimates used in the income process calibration
Chile Spain USA
Earnings variance 0.4779 0.4557 0.3337
Q 0.4991 0.6762 0.6511
The estimation strategy used for the simulated methods of moments is
the following. I solve the precautionary-savings incomplete-markets model
numerically over a grid of the parameters of interest: time discount rate δ,
coefficient of relative risk aversion α and variance of the measurement error
σ2γ. For each grid-point I compute the wealth moments (mean and median)
and the consumption and wealth responses to income shocks for the rele-
vant time horizons N . Finally the estimates are those which minimise the
distance between the model generated moments and the data moments. I
refer to Appendix C of Chapter 2 for details about the model solution and
estimation.
The three-dimensional grid is constructed as follow. For the discount
factor β = 1/(1 + δ) ∈ [0.90, 0.98] with distance 0.0025 between adja-
cent points of the discount rate δ, the coefficient of relative risk aversion
α ∈ [0.40, 3.20] with distance 0.05 between adjacent grid-points. Finally,
the grid for σ2γ varies for each country. As I present in Appendix G, the
highest amount of measurement error allowed depends on the variance of
the earning process, the ratio Q and the nature of the shocks (permanent
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or persistent). I am presenting the results for the model with permanent
shocks, so the maximum measurement error variance for Chile is 0.0383,
for Spain it is 0.0275 and for the United States it is 0.0209.
3.4.2 Model results
I report the estimation results for Spain in Table (3.4). The estimated
set of parameters is plausible. The discount factor β is 0.969. The esti-
mated coefficient of relative risk aversion is 0.90, suggesting that the felicity
function for Spain is close to logarithmic. Finally, the model estimates no
measurement error, which implies that the variance of the permanent (σ2η)
and transitory shocks (σ2ε) are 0.0186 and 0.0275 respectively.
In the last row I reproduce the data moments from the EFF. The model
performance is mixed in terms of generating the targeted moments for the
estimated parametrization. In terms of net worth, the model overestimates
the median and underestimates the mean. Qualitatively, the model is able
to capture the decreasing wealth profile over time to income shocks. How-
ever, quantitatively the intercept of the wealth response over time (N=3) is
overestimated and the slope is flatter than the data. For the consumption
responses the model struggles the most: the model intercept is four times
the one observed in the data and the generated slope is 2.5 times bigger.
In Table (3.5) I reproduce the model estimation for the United States.
The parameter estimates are reasonable. The coefficient of relative risk
aversion α = 0.65, is slightly smaller than 1. The discount factor β is 0.973
and the variance of measurement error (σ2γ) is 0.01. The estimated size of
σ2γ implies a variance of the permanent shock of 0.0136 and a variance of
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Table 3.4: Model estimation for Spain.
Parameters β = 0.969 (0.006), α = 0.90 (0.314), σ2γ = 0.00 (0.015)
Wealth Consumption Response Wealth Response
Median Mean N = 3 N = 6 N = 3 N = 6
Model 0.949 1.202 0.480 0.628 0.295 0.264
(0.096) (0.115) (0.079) (0.075) (0.145) (0.186)
Data 0.798 1.390 0.127 0.186 0.459 0.123
Source: Author’s calculation. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Since
the estimation of measurement error is at the bound, I compute the stan-
dard error for a value of σ2γ = 0.001.
the transitory shock of 0.0109.
The targeted moments for the United States are difficult to match for
the standard precautionary-savings incomplete-markets model. The ob-
served net worth distribution presents high levels of skewness even though
the households have low levels of wealth. The estimated mean net worth
is one third lower than that observed in the data and the median is 6
times higher. These moments of the distribution are very precisely es-
timated. The model predicts a slightly decreasing response of saving to
income shocks. The level of the responses is in line with the data esti-
mates. In terms of the consumption responses, the model does not obtain
good results. The predicted responses of consumption to income shocks are
much stronger in the model and the slope of responses over time is twice
that observed in the data.
As I highlighted in the data section, the data for Chile presents a chal-
lenge for the structural estimation, since half of the selected sample is
indebted and the mean net worth is about −10% of mean income. To al-
low the model to capture this feature I add transfers to the households and
allow them to have debt, imposing the solvency constraint at the borrowing
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Table 3.5: Model estimation for the United States.
Parameters β = 0.973(0.002), α = 0.65(0.124), σ2γ = 0.01(0.002)
Wealth Consumption Response Wealth Response
Median Mean N=2 N=4 N=6 N=2 N=4 N=6
Model 0.252 0.331 0.410 0.569 0.657 0.171 0.155 0.149
(0.015) (0.017) (0.036) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036) (0.041) (0.044)
Data 0.038 0.482 0.068 0.092 0.184 0.164 0.131 0.159
Source: Author’s calculation. Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
limit. I estimate the levels of transfers as another parameter of the model.
I report the model estimation for Chile in Table (3.6). All the parameters
present plausible values and are inside the grid. Households present high
levels of impatience (β = 0.905) and low levels of risk aversion (α = 0.90).
The estimation implies no transfers and the estimated variance of mea-
surement error is 0.025. Under this specification the variance of permanent
shocks is 0.0191 and the variance of the transitory shock is 0.0133.
The parameter estimates entail a low target level of wealth compatible
with what is observed in the data. Given the precision of the median
estimates, the simulated method of moments assigns more weight to the
median than the mean. The median net worth is matched exactly, but
as expected the standard precautionary-savings incomplete-markets model
is not capable of generating a negatively skewed wealth distribution and
thus the model mean net worth is positive. The model predicted wealth
responses over time match those in the data. Moreover, as for the other
countries, the model-implied consumption responses to changes in income
are much higher than the ones observed in the Chilean sample.
Analysing the data estimates presented in Table 3.2 with the structural
model, I provide some intuition about the income process and relevance of
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Table 3.6: Model estimation for Chile.
Parameters β = 0.905(0.001), α = 0.90(0.001), Tr = 0(0.008), σ2γ = 0.025(0.0001)
Wealth Consumption Response Wealth Response
Median Mean N=2 N=5 N=2 N=5
Model 0.000 0.018 0.496 0.662 0.013 0.005
(1.5e-05) (0.003) (0.050) (0.050) (0.012) (0.008)
Data 0.000 -0.096 0.136 0.332 0.013 0.003
Source: Author’s calculation. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Since
the estimation of transfers is at the bound, I compute the standard error
for a value of Tr = 0.001.
the borrowing constraints. Chile’s small wealth responses to income shocks
suggest the very low importance of the transitory shocks and imply that
income is mainly driven by permanent shocks. This evidence is in line with
the results obtained by Huneeus and Repetto (2005), who find very low
variance of transitory shocks; I report these results in Table G.1 of Ap-
pendix G. In all the samples the consumption responses are significantly
smaller than one, suggesting the existence of precautionary saving motives
and possibly the presence of measurement error. Moreover, the fact that
wealth profiles are non-increasing, even though noisily estimated, suggests
that the strength of the precautionary motive is moderated and the finan-
cial market imperfections such as borrowing constraints are not important
for the household consumption behaviour in the three samples.
3.4.3 Robustness and model evaluation
It is clear from the tables presented above that the standard precautionary-
savings incomplete-markets model is having difficulties in matching some
of the data moments for each country. As I estimate more moments than
parameters I can test the model performance using the test of overidenti-
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fying restrictions. For all the three countries, the model is easily rejected
when the eight moments are targeted.
One particular feature of the data is the high level of skewness of the
net worth distribution. This can be seen by the high mean-median ratios
which for Spain is 1.7 and for the United States is 12.7. This is a feature
of the wealth distribution data which is hard for the model to match.
One possibility in future research would be to improve the model in line
with Krusell, Smith, and Jr. (1998) who assume preferences heterogeneity
allowing for different discount factors.
The other feature that the standard model is unable to match is the
level of consumption responses to income shocks. The model-implied con-
sumption responses are greater than those observed in the data. Increasing
the amount of measurement error might help to generate lower consump-
tion responses. However this direction is not promising, for two reasons.
First, the maximum amount of measurement error is limited in the cal-
ibration (see Appendix G). Second, as explained in Chapter 2, a higher
measurement error will make the wealth responses flatter or even increas-
ing, which would worsen the fit of the model. An alternative to lowering
the level of the consumption responses is to reduce the persistence of the
income shocks. If income shocks become less persistent, households start
to save a higher fraction of the shocks. This is a tension, however, with the
higher level of wealth responses which become greater in N when shocks
are less persistent. In Chapter 2 I show, for the permanent-income model,
how a wealth response to income shocks which decreases over time requires
high levels of income persistence in the model. Although there are no closed
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form solutions for the precautionary-savings model the intuition is similar.8
To better understand which feature of the data is difficult for the model
to generate, I estimate it using different subsets of the data targets. I have
found that when one of the net worth moments and the wealth responses
over time are targeted, the model fit significantly improves. Since I am
estimating the level of transfers as another parameter for Chile, I conduct
this restricted model exercise only for Spain and the United States. The
results are reported in Table (3.7).
In the restricted estimation for Spain, the model has the same number
of parameters and moments, so that there are no overidentifying restric-
tions to test. I present the results for Spain in Panel (a) of Table (3.7). The
two estimated sets of parameters fit the corresponding targeted net worth
moment, median or mean very well. Concerning the wealth profile, both
parametrizations predict very similar results, which are lower and some-
what flatter than the profiles observed in the data; but in both cases the
data moments are inside two standard deviations of the estimated response.
Interestingly the estimated parameters are almost the same when the mean
is targeted, and when the full model with eight moments is estimated.
For the United States, abstracting from one net worth moment and the
consumption responses significantly improves the fit of the model. The es-
timated parameters and their predictions are displayed in Panel (b). For
these restricted models, which target median or mean net worth and the
asset responses at three horizons N = 2, 4, 6, I can run a test of the overi-
8Allowing for persistent shocks implies that I cannot reduce the state space by nor-
malizing variables by the permanent income. With two state variables the model be-
comes more computationally intensive to solve. I have estimated the model for Spain
and the United States for values of ρ between 0.97 and 0.995 and the resulting wealth
profiles are increasing.
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dentifying restrictions. When the mean net worth is targeted along with
the wealth responses, the model is comfortably accepted (it has a p-value of
49.8%). Instead when the median net worth is targeted, the fit of the model
worsens (the restrictions have a p-value of 5.1%). When the restricted
model which targets mean net worth is estimated, the set of parameters
obtained is very similar to the full model estimation.
The empirical data estimations of the way that net worth holdings react
to changes in income over time suggest that precautionary motives are not
very strong in the sub-samples considered for the three countries. For all
three countries, the wealth responses over time to income shocks are non-
increasing. As I discuss in the second chapter, following the argument of
Krueger and Perri (2011), if agents had a strong precautionary savings
motive, wealth responses should increase.
The estimation of a standard precautionary-savings incomplete-markets
model for three different countries shows that the precautionary saving
motives are not very strong. After estimating a structural model for the
three countries, in which the size of precautionary-savings is disciplined
by matching observed moments of the net worth distribution, I find that
the predicted wealth profile is decreasing in the horizon N . The estimated
levels of patience and risk aversion for the households are low, suggesting
the existence of a low target level of wealth. Hence, households do not
exhibit strong precautionary saving motives, even though they have low
net worth and may be close of the borrowing constraints.
The structural estimation of a partial equilibrium model allows me to
compare the parameters for the three considered countries. Let me discuss
what may drive these different estimates. First, some differences come from
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Table 3.7: Estimation targeting one net worth moment and the wealth
responses over time
Panel (a): Spain
Median Mean N=3 N=6
Data 0.798 1.390 0.459 0.123
Targets: median net worth, wealth responses over time
Parameters β = 0.948(0.004), α = 1.70(0.124), σ2γ = 0.000(0.011)
Model 0.819 0.307 0.285
(0.083) (0.137) (0.171)
Targets: mean net worth, wealth responses over time
Parameters β = 0.971(0.002), α = 0.80(0.132), σ2γ = 0.000(0.022)
Model 1.403 0.294 0.265
(0.133) (0.156) (0.210)
Panel (b): United States
Median Mean N=2 N=4 N=6
Data 0.038 0.482 0.164 0.131 0.159
Targets: median net worth, wealth responses over time
Parameters β = 0.964(0.006), α = 0.50(0.156), σ2γ = 0.005(0.002)
Model 0.038 0.187 0.163 0.141
(0.005) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024)
Test of overidentifying restrictions: 3.802
Targets: mean net worth, wealth responses over time
Parameters β = 0.957(0.001), α = 1.55(0.031), σ2γ = 0.01(0.002)
Model 0.481 0.171 0.152 0.147
(0.022) (0.038) (0.046) (0.050)
Test of overidentifying restrictions: 0.458
10% critical value of chi-sq (1): 2.706
5% critical value of chi-sq (1): 3.841
1% critical value of chi-sq (1): 6.635
Source: Author’s calculation. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Since
the estimation of measurement error for Spain is at the bound, I compute
the standard error for a value of σ2γ = 0.001.
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the fact that the same sub-sample of households could react diversely given
the different stages of development in their financial markets. Households
in Chile or Spain, with access to less developed financial markets than
the ones in the United States, may have more difficulties in sharing risk
and insuring themselves against earnings fluctuations or may have more
chances to be subject to borrowing constraints. Second, the households
are subject to different levels of earnings inequality, which affect the levels
of income uncertainty and thus the way in which households take their
insurance decisions. Third, the support provided by the public welfare
system is different, so households are subject to unequal social insurance
levels, which can affect their behaviour. Last, some considerations related
to data availability should be highlighted. Although there are overlapping
periods in the countries’ surveys there are important data limitations for
the analysis: the data for Chile and Spain cover more recent time periods
and thus have fewer waves and the frequency and last period covered are
not the same across countries. For instance, the recent global financial crisis
is not captured in all data sets: data for Spain are available until 2008, for
Chile until 2009 and for the United States until 2010. Furthermore, the
impact of the crisis has varied for these economies.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I explore what can be learned from international evidence
on households’ consumption and saving decisions in their reaction to in-
come shocks. Furthermore, I analyse what implications about financial
imperfections can be derived from their behaviour.
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I construct the required data for Chile, Spain and the United States,
for which panel data exist with information on consumption, wealth and
income. Even though the households’ net worth distribution is different
across the analysed sub-samples, the empirical evidence shows consump-
tion responses which are increasing over time, have similar levels, and are
significant and precisely estimated. This is not the case for the estimated
wealth responses to income shocks. The wealth profiles are less precisely
estimated, in particular for Spain, due to a small sample size. The point es-
timates present a non-increasing profile for all three countries, which can be
interpreted as evidence suggesting that the household behaviour for these
economies is not affected by the presence of borrowing constraints.
I structurally estimate a standard precautionary-savings incomplete-
markets model for each of the three countries. With the objective of disci-
plining the amount of precautionary-savings I target the median and mean
of the net worth distribution and the consumption and wealth responses to
income shocks over time. The obtained results are mixed. On the one hand,
the wealth responses over time qualitatively, and, in some cases quantita-
tively, replicate the decreasing pattern observed in the data. On the other
hand, the model-implied net worth moments and the predicted consump-
tion responses do not match the data precisely. Formally, using the test of
overidentifying restrictions the model is rejected for each of the countries.
Analysing the contributions of each moment to the model fit, I find that the
consumption responses and the skewness of the wealth distribution make
the test reject the model. I estimate a restricted model which ignores the
consumption responses and consider only one of the net worth moments
plus the wealth profiles as targets. For this restricted model the statistic
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of the test of overidentifying restrictions improves significantly.
The model estimates imply moderate levels of impatience and a low level
of risk aversion which imply that the households in the three countries have
a low target level of wealth. Furthermore, the parametrizations in the full
and restricted model imply that, after accounting for precautionary savings,
the wealth profile over time is decreasing. This evidence, in line with the
data, suggests that the risk of being constrained for the households in the
sub-samples is not important. To some extent this is surprising since it
suggests that financial markets across all countries are not very different in
terms of development.
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Appendix D
The macroeconomic situation
in each of the countries
Macroeconomic situation
The effects of the global financial crisis were different in the three analysed
countries. The GDP in the United States contracted over 2008-2009. In real
terms the activity fell by a cumulative 3.1%, with unemployment peaking
at 10% by the end of 2009. Since 2010 the economy has started to show
weak signs of recovery.
The effect of the crisis in the Euro area were stronger and recovery
in the region is proceeding at a slower pace. The Spanish economy has
been severely affected, GDP fell by 4.0% between 2009 and 2010, and the
activity declined even further in 2012 (1.6%) after showing no growth in
2011 (0.1%). Labour market conditions deteriorated and unemployment
rose by 7 percentage points to reach 18% in 2009. In the following years
the employment conditions worsened and unemployment continued to grow,
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Figure D.1: Macroeconomic situation in the United States. Source: OECD.
Note: The thick line highlights the period covered by the PSID used in the
chapter.
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Figure D.2: Macroeconomic situation in Spain. Source: OECD. Note: The
thick line highlights the period covered by the EFF used in the chapter.
91
reaching 25.1% in 2012.
In the developing economies the effect of the crisis and the recovery pat-
tern was different: the impact of the crisis was not so severe and in general
these economies experienced solid growth rates. In particular, economic
activity in Chile contracted only during 2009. Real GDP dropped by 1.0%
and recovered one year later, growing by 5.8% and surpassing its pre-crisis
level. Before being hit by the crisis, unemployment levels in the Chilean
economy had a decreasing trend, falling from 10% in 2004 to 7.1% in 2007.
During 2009 unemployment rose to 9.7% but afterwards declined again.
Households behaviour
In each country households adjusted their consumption and saving be-
haviour during the crisis.
In the United States, real households’ non-durable consumption dropped
by 1.5% and the net saving rate increased by 3.1 percentage points, amount-
ing to 5.5% of the household disposable income. In 2009, when the eco-
nomic activity contracted, households’ disposable income fell by 2.1% and
non-durable consumption was reduced further (1.4%). After a decade of
increasing household debts in terms of disposable income (44% between
1998 and 2007) mainly driven by mortgages, households reduced their in-
debtedness levels by 10% between 2008 and 2010.
Although the Spanish economy contracted in 2009, household income
did not fall until 2010. In fact during 2008 and 2009, while the GDP growth
was slowing down or even negative, households’ real disposable income
increased. Household consumption was almost stable in 2009 (0.44%) and
decreased in 2010 (−1.44%).
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Figure D.3: Macroeconomic situation in Chile. Source: OECD. Note: The
thick line highlights the period covered by the EPS used in the chapter.
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Chilean households were less affected by the crisis. Their real dispos-
able income always showed positive growth rates despite the 2009 GDP
contraction. In fact it was only in that year that household non-durable
consumption dropped by 0.80% and their savings as a fraction of their
disposable income almost doubled (from 6.0% to 10.9%). During 2010 the
recovery of the Chilean economy was faster than that of the world economy.
Household consumption increased 8.9% and the savings rate of households
diminished to 8.1% of disposable income.
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Appendix E
Sample Construction
E.1 Chile
The Social Protection Survey (EPS) can be downloaded at http://www.
proteccionsocial.cl/index.asp. There are four waves available corre-
sponding to the years 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2009. The first wave includes
only current and former members of the social security system and it does
not include information about household wealth so I do not consider it in
the investigation.
Variable definitions
The EPS does not provide a consolidated measure of non-durable con-
sumption. I aggregate reported expenditures on goods and services as
follows: food, clothing, utilities, transport, education, domestic services,
health (care services, hospitalizations, controls, immunizations, medicines,
lenses, prosthesis, etc..) and insurance (this includes life, car, fire, theft,
complementary health and other insurance). To make this variable com-
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patible with those of the other countries I do not include housing services.
For labour earnings I consider head and spouse labour income plus
transfers. The EPS provides information on after tax labour income. I
consider earnings from the principal, secondary and other jobs; as well
payments in kind, bonuses and royalties.
To construct households’ net worth I aggregate their real estate value
net of debt (main dwelling and other properties), means of transport, ma-
chinery (equipment, terrain, animals, agricultural facilities and others),
business wealth and financial wealth net of debt. Financial wealth includes:
savings (current account, fixed deposits, housing savings and voluntary pen-
sion savings), mutual funds holdings, stocks or corporate bonds, loans to
third parties and other savings (cash holdings, foreign currency, “mattress
money”, etc.). Debt includes: owed money (current account debt, credit
card debt, educational debt, and other debt) and credit taken (bank credit,
commercial house micro credit, financial house consumer credit, automo-
tive credit, social credit, friends or family loans and money lender credit).
Sample construction
For the three waves I consider (2004, 2006 and 2009) the EPS has 47, 633 ob-
servations corresponding to 18, 807 households. I remove from the dataset
those observations which report zero food consumption (1, 918 observa-
tions)and zero labour income (8, 072 observations). I remove as well those
households which appear in one wave only (4, 056 observations).
I find an issue with the Chilean data which is not documented. Certain
questions of 2006 report answers which have extremely high values when
compared to the same question for the same household in the two other
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waves.1 These answers do not correspond to “no answer” or “don’t know”
or missing values, because they are coded differently. I discard the possibil-
ity that they could correspond to any way of top coding. Besides, I find no
kind of pattern across households for that wave to explain these values. As
this kind of response appears in one component of the aggregate variables
that I construct, I recode them to zero so as not to lose the observation
and further reduce the final sample size.
When I impose the sample selection criteria (head of the household is
between 25 and 55 years old, dependent worker, there are no members in
the household with business, the household is renting or freely using the
dwelling and has no other real estate property), the number of observations
reduces to 4, 636 (I drop 28, 951 observations). Home ownership is the
reason why the sample reduces so dramatically when imposing the selection
criteria. Of the cleaned sample only 7, 118 (21.2%) observations correspond
to those who are renting or freely using the home. Furthermore, 21, 7% of
those renting or freely using housing are not in the prime age group (25 to
55 years old).
In order to have a balanced panel when computing the two year and
five year differences I keep those who were interviewed in all three waves.
This is another heavy restriction, since only 837 observations out of 4, 636
correspond to households which were interviewed in all waves. Finally I
remove income outliers (135 observations).2
Cleaning the sample and imposing the sample selection result in a final
sample with 702 observations corresponding to 234 households observed
1For different questions the figures can be 1.00e+ 08, 1.00e+ 09 or 1.00e+ 10.
2I define income outliers with similar criteria to those adopted by Blundell, Pistaferri,
and Preston (2008): those household with an income growth higher than 500% or below
−80%.
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between 2004 and 2009.
E.2 Spain
The Survey of Household Finances (EFF) can be downloaded at http://
www.bde.es/bde/en/areas/estadis/Otras_estadistic. For each avail-
able wave the Bank of Spain provides five multiple imputation versions of
the missing original data.3 In the analysis I use the data with no imputa-
tions which can be constructed from a file with the original status of each
variable.
Variable definitions
The variable that I construct for consumption includes all non-durable
household expenses, which the survey reports as an aggregate (question
9.1), plus insurance services. I exclude housing services from this measure.
I generate labour income as the sum of head and spouse labour earnings
plus transfers. The labour earnings reported by the EFF are before tax.
This is a difference from the variable that I use in the other countries, for
which I manage to construct an after tax measure. From the data esti-
mation perspective considering gross labour earnings has two implications.
First, the income moments, mean and variance, will be higher than the af-
ter tax moments. This matters for the income process calibration. Second,
it can affect the estimation of the way in which changes in consumption
and wealth react to changes in income shocks. If the marginal tax rate is
locally constant, there are no impacts on the estimation of income shocks
3Description of the multiple imputation method that the institution uses can be
found on its website.
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before or after tax and thus no effects over the estimation of the household
behaviour.
I construct the wealth of the household as the sum of financial assets
net of debt plus the value of real assets (household appliances, vehicles
and valuables) and the present value of the pension scheme or other future
pension provision. Financial assets include balances in current and term
accounts (including house-purchase saving account), shares in listed and
unlisted companies, participations in mutual funds and other portfolio in-
vestment institutions, public or private fixed income securities and other
financial assets (options or loans to third parties).
Sample construction
From the three waves available (2002, 2005 and 2008) the EFF consist of
17, 302 interviews and 10, 755 households. In order to obtain a balanced
panel when computing the three year and six year differences, I keep the
households which were interviewed in the three waves (I drop 7, 445 ob-
servations corresponding to households which participated in one or two
waves only). I remove those households without information on education
(13 observations) and those which report zero food consumption (418 ob-
servations). I do not clean the sample from income outliers as I do for the
other countries due to sample size restrictions which I explain below.
As I mentioned before, I need to relax the selection criteria for Spain
in order to obtain a sample with a minimum acceptable size to estimate
household behaviour. Spain is a country with one of the highest levels
homeownership. If I consider the balanced panel sample of households
which are renting or have free use of the dwelling, it represents 11.7% of
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the total. In addition, of those 1, 304 observations corresponding to renters
or free users in the balanced panel, 28.6% own other properties, 13.0%
are self-employed and 23.6% are retired. Consequently if I apply the same
sample criteria used in the other countries (head of the household between
25 and 55 years old, no self-employed members, renting or freely using their
homes and without any other real estate properties) the sample size is 126
observations corresponding to 42 households.
I use a different approach for Spain so as to increase the sample size.
In particular I relax the sample selection criteria for the second and third
wave so I impose the sample requirements on the household only the first
time it is observed. As a result of the shocks received between the first
and second wave and the first and third wave, the household might make
decisions which changed its eligibility (become self-employed, buy a real
estate property, etc.). What is important is the timing and whether, when
the household is first observed, it fulfils the selection criteria.
When I impose these relaxed sample selection criteria for Spain, I end
up with 264 observations corresponding to 88 households observed between
2002 and 2008.
E.3 United States
The PSID data can be downloaded at http://psidonline.isr.umich.
edu/. For the variables related to consumption, labour earnings and all rele-
vant demographic household information I use the “PACKAGED DATA”.
The wealth related variables from 1998 to 2006 are provided as special
files.4 For the last two waves (2008 and 2010) I construct the equivalent
4The wealth supplement is also available for the years 1984, 1989 and 1994.
100
supplement files from the “PACKAGED DATA”.
The PSID labour earning questions are retrospective; for example, in
2011 the interviewees reported their 2010 labour earnings. I consider this
element when working with the sample (e.g. correcting the age of the head
of the household or using the appropriate timing when deflating nominal
variables).
As mentioned before, I consider households which appear in consecutive
waves. Every time the head of the household changes I consider it as a
different household.
Values are in constant dollars; to deflate nominal variables I use the
Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers and all items. Moreover, I
report values in adult equivalent units using the OECD scale. Finally all
relevant variables are expressed in annual terms.
Variable definitions
The interviews of the PSID had limited information about non-durable con-
sumption but this has improved since the end of the 1990s. From 1968 the
non-durable consumption variables gathered by the PSID are food expendi-
ture at and away from home (since 1994 this includes food delivered). Thus
to study consumption in the United States the most-widely used dataset is
the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). In 1999 the PSID included new
questions about outlays in health care, transportation and education. Fur-
thermore since 2005 the survey has included questions about expenditure
on clothing, trips and vacations, recreation and entertainment. According
to Charles, Danziger, Li, and Schoeni (2006) with the expanded consump-
tion questions the PSID covers more than 70 percent of the consumption
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expenditure measured by the CEX.
I consider two definitions of non-durable consumption which depend on
data availability. A narrower one that can be constructed from 1998 in-
cludes food consumption, utilities expenditure (electricity, heating, water
and other utilities), transportation expenditure (car repairs and mainte-
nance, gasoline, parking, bus and train fares, taxi expenses, other trans-
portation cost and other vehicle expenditures), education expenses and
child care. A broader definition is available from 2004 and adds to the
narrower measure outlays on clothing, trips and vacations, recreation and
entertainment (movies, sporting events, performing arts and hobbies, read-
ing materials) and telecommunication (telephone, cable or satellite TV,
internet service).
I construct the labour income of the household as the sum of the head
and spouse after tax labour income plus transfers. The PSID reports gross
labour income so I use the TAXSIM model from the NBER to estimate the
amount of Federal and State taxes that the household has to pay.
The PSID provides wealth supplement files which include imputed vari-
ables containing information on the assets and debts of the households. The
wealth measure that I consider for this research is the imputed wealth of
the household without the value of the home equity. This variable, which
is net of debts, includes seven asset categories: farm or business wealth,
savings, real estate, stocks (including mutual funds or investment trusts),
vehicles, other assets (bond funds, life insurance, valuables) and private
annuities or individual retirement accounts. When imposing the sample
selection some categories of this wealth aggregate variable are zero.
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Sample construction
The PSID data between 1998 and 2010 includes 56,113 observations for
13,322 households. I clean the sample of those households without in-
formation on education (1,320), race (640 observations), consumption (28
observations) and region (5 observations). In addition, I remove the house-
holds which report zero food consumption (956 observations). I impose the
condition that the interviewed units should appear in at least two waves
and in consecutive spells (drop 4,832 observations). Following Blundell,
Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), who also work with the PSID, I clean in-
come outliers from the sample (drop 7,055 observations).5 The first stage
of the sample cleaning leads to 41,305 observations for 8,670 households.
Next that I impose the other sample requirements: the head of the
household should be an active worker in the prime age (between 25 and 55
years), none of the household members are self-employed or entrepreneurs,
the household is renting or freely using the dwelling and it does not have
any other real estate property.
Finally I construct the sample such that the household is observed con-
secutively since 2004 and thus can construct the second, fourth and six
differences for consumption, income and wealth. These steps give me a
balanced panel consisting of 1, 520 observations corresponding to 380 house-
holds.
5Households’ outliers with respect to income are those with an income growth higher
than 500%, below −80% or with less than $100 a year.
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Appendix F
The construction of shocks
In order to construct measures for income, consumption and wealth shocks,
I remove the predictable component from those variables. I regress the re-
spective series on a quartic polynomial of the age of the household head,
time dummies and a set of other demographic potentially relevant charac-
teristics. For this set I consider: education, gender, race, working sector,
civil status of the head, region of residence and interactions between edu-
cation dummies with age and age squared.
One issue to consider is that the information reported by the different
surveys is not homogeneous, which limits the covariates that I can use in
the first set of OLS regressions to construct the shocks. Below I provide
more information about the variables used for each country. In addition, I
use Wald tests to assess which set of covariates to include in the regressions
for each analysed country.
In the case of Chile I identify some under-reporting problems in the
EPS. The average household labour income in the EPS for the year 2006 is
about 40% less than the reported value of the Encuesta de Presupuestos Fa-
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miliares (Survey of Family Budget) conducted in 2006-2007 by the National
Institute of Statistics which is specifically designed to study the income and
spending of the Chilean families.1This is an issue that is not a problem for
my estimations as long as it implies only level effects across all waves, and
thus changes in income still identify income shocks correctly.
For Chile I include as covariates: a quartic polynomial of the age of the
household head, educational dummies and interaction between education
and age, and regional and time dummies. I find that gender, civil status,
working sector and interactions between age squared and education do not
contribute significantly to the model.
In the case of Spain the covariates that I consider are: a quartic poly-
nomial of the age of the household head, educational dummies and the
interaction with age, and gender of the head of the household. The Span-
ish survey do not provide any information about race or region of residence.
Finally for the United States I regress the variables of interest on: a
quartic polynomial of the age of the household head, educational dummies
and the interaction with age, race and gender of the head of the household
and region of residence. The interaction between educational dummies and
age squared is not statistically significant.
1More evidence about potential EPS data problems can be found in de Mesa, Bravo,
Behrman, Mitchell, and Todd (2006) who report discrepancies between self-report pen-
sion variables in the EPS and administrative records.
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Appendix G
Calibration of the income
process
An important step in the model is the calibration of the income process.
First, I describe the strategy followed to calibrate the model income process.
Second, I provide more details of the way in which I implement it for each
country.
G.1 Calibration strategy
I reproduce here the income process (3.5) that I specify for the model,
which includes measurement error:
y˜t = yt + γt,
where γt ∼ N
(
0, σ2γ
)
is classical measurement error and is assumed to be
i.i.d. over time and uncorrelated with the transitory (εt) and permanent
(ηt) income shocks.
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When I calibrate the income process for different countries the objec-
tive is to match two features of the data. One is the earnings inequality,
which I measure as the residual variance of a regression of logarithmic head
and spouse earnings on predictable components, usually demographics of
the household and the regional and time dummies selected as described in
Appendix F. The other feature to match is the ratio Q, the relative impor-
tance of the permanent (or persistent) shocks over the temporary shocks,
which are formed by the transitory shocks plus the measurement error.
In the case of the shocks which are permanent, ρ = 1 in Equation (3.4),
the system of equations that I use to calibrate the amount of permanent
shocks (σ2η), transitory shocks (σ
2
ε) and measurement error (σ
2
γ) is:

σ2η
σ2ε+σ
2
γ
= Q
σ2ε +
(T+1)
2
σ2η + σ
2
γ = σ
2
log(Y ),
and if I allow income shocks to become persistent, 0 < ρ < 1 in Equation
(3.4), the system becomes:

σ2η
σ2ε+σ
2
γ
= Q
σ2ε +
σ2η
1−ρ2 + σ
2
γ = σ
2
log(Y ),
where σ2log(Y ) is the residual variance of earnings.
When solving the model for each country, Q and σ2log(Y ) come from
external estimates. Therefore in each point on the parameter grid, for
a given amount of measurement error (σ2γ) I can obtain the values for
the transitory and permanent (or persistent) shocks from the following
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expressions. For the permanent income case:
σ2ε =
σ2log(Y )
1 + T+1
2
Q
− σ2γ,
σ2η = Q(σ
2
ε + σ
2
γ),
and for the persistent income case:
σ2ε =
σ2log(Y )
1 + Q
1−ρ2
− σ2γ,
σ2η = Q(σ
2
ε + σ
2
γ).
With this strategy I can be sure that the model is replicating the ob-
served variance of residual earnings and the ratio of persistent (or perma-
nent) to temporary shocks to match the amount observed in data.
I highlight two implications from the calibration strategy described
above. First, the equation for transitory shocks explicitly sets the max-
imum amount of measurement error permitted, since the variance of the
transitory shocks has to be positive. However, for this restriction, this is
a flexible calibration strategy, since the system of equations that I use to
calibrate income is undetermined. For given values of the residual variance
and Q, and an assumption about income persistence ρ, there exist an in-
finite number of combinations of σ2η, σ
2
ε , and σ
2
γ which solve the system of
equations.
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G.2 Calibration implementation
Ideally the earnings inequality and the ratio Q to calibrate used in the
model would come from the data that generate the moments which I am
trying to match with the model.
A possible method used in the literature to obtain the income decom-
position is the one proposed by Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008). It
uses covariances of growth income rates at one lag to identify the variance
of the transitory shocks. Then the variance of the permanent shock can be
obtained by subtracting the current and previous transitory variance from
the income growth covariance between two periods. These expressions need
to be modified to account for the fact that the surveys are carried out every
two or three years. Using this methodology implies that at least 4 waves
are needed to be able to identify the permanent and transitory variance.
Following this methodology I am able to estimate the income decom-
position but only for the United States. So far only 3 waves have been
released for the Chilean and Spanish Surveys, so there are not enough data
to estimate the permanent and transitory variance. Thus, I use external
estimates based on other surveys to obtain the required inputs. There are
some drawbacks to using the external estimates for Chile and Spain. For
instance, the time span and surveys used in these estimates differ from
the ones used in my investigation. Moreover, the variables used in those
studies do not match exactly the ones I employ. Up to the time of this
research these sources have been the most reliable and these issues will be
resolved when new waves become available. In the next subsections I detail
the implementation that I follow for each country.
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Chile
The fourth wave of the EPS corresponding to the year 2012 was scheduled
for the second semester of 2013 but it was not available in time for this
research. To calibrate Q, I rescale estimates from Huneeus and Repetto
(2005) using the log-residual variance of earnings from my data estimates.
In the Chilean study Huneeus and Repetto (2005) use the Encuesta
Suplementaria de Ingresos (ESI, Supplement income survey) which ran
between 1990 and 2000. Given that it is a cross-sectional survey the au-
thors build a synthetic panel to estimate the income decomposition between
transitory and permanent shocks. This methodology has potential impli-
cations for the estimated variances, since it uses cohort heterogeneity to
proxy the individual heterogeneity. The authors acknowledge this issue.
To assess it they apply the same pseudo panel methodology to the PSID
data, which they then compare with the estimation using the PSID panel
component.
I reproduce the findings of Huneeus and Repetto (2005) on the first three
rows of Table G.1. Their results suggest the presence of a negative bias
when estimating the variances using the pseudo panel. This bias is stronger
in the case of the transitory shocks. I compute the ratios of the estimations
using individual over cohort information for the PSID and report them in
the fourth row. If it is assumed that the different income variances are at
cohort level, so individuals are exposed to the same amount of permanent or
transitory shocks, I can extrapolate the Chilean cohort data using the above
mentioned ratios as scaling factors and obtain a proxy for the variances at
an individual level. I report these figures in the last row of Table G.1. The
value Q of the relative importance of permanent over transitory shocks is
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0.4988.
Table G.1: Income decomposition for Chile
Permanent Transitory
variance variance
(I): ESI, cohorts 0.00303 0.00030
(II): PSID, cohorts 0.01181 0.00080
(III): PSID, individuals 0.08150 0.11173
(IV): Scaling factor (III)/(II) 6.90 139.66
(V): ESI, rescaled (I)*(IV) 0.02091 0.04190
Source: Huneeus and Repetto (2005) and author’s calculations.
One drawback to consider is that the earnings measure used by Huneeus
and Repetto (2005) corresponds to the labour earnings of the head of the
household, whereas I use head and spouse labour earnings. However, their
results are robust enough to include transfers in income and to make dif-
ferent income specifications.1
Finally, with respect to log-residual earnings I use my estimates which
were constructed following the procedure described in Appendix F. I set
σ2log(Y ) = 0.4988. First, I opt to use this figure because Huneeus and
Repetto (2005) do not report it. Second, using my estimates I make sure
that the residual earnings match the period and variable definitions used to
estimate the consumption and wealth response of the households to income
shocks. Although I recognise that the Q comes from another survey and
time period, it is the best estimate until the next wave of the EPS becomes
available.
1They consider a permanent or a persistent component and the transitory shocks
that are i.i.d. or have a MA(1) structure.
111
Spain
The fourth wave of the EFF, corresponding to the year 2012, was not avail-
able at the time this research was done. Thus I cannot estimate an income
decomposition between permanent and transitory shocks due to a lack of
information. To overcome this issue I obtain the inputs to calibrate the
income process from Pijoan-Mas and Sanchez-Marcos (2010), who use the
Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares (ECPF, Household expen-
diture survey), a panel from 1985 to 1996.
When studying income inequality the authors regress net annual equiv-
alised household earnings over an age polynomial and time, education and
family composition dummies. From this regression they obtain the resid-
ual variance. I take the average over the 12 years to calibrate the residual
earnings variance for Spain: σ2log(Y ) = 0.4557. The estimation procedure
followed by Pijoan-Mas and Sanchez-Marcos (2010) has several points in
common with the methodology that I use: very similar labour earnings def-
inition, the same OECD equivalence scale to normalise the variables and
a comparable set of covariates. However there are two issues worth men-
tioning. The first one is related to the time period used in their estimation
and the second one to the fact that the ECPF provide earnings after tax.
Although having this measure is the best option, as I highlight above, the
EFF reports before tax earnings.
The authors estimate as well the income process for the household’s
net labour earnings. I use the average of these estimations to construct
a measure for Q which I set equal to 0.6762. The average variance of
permanent shocks (σ2η) is 0.0407 and the average variance of transitory
shocks (σε) is 0.0602. The only issue to highlight is that the ECPF data
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is reported quarterly, because the survey follows 3, 600 households for up
to 8 consecutive quarters. When the authors estimate the income process,
which is specified as a permanent component plus a transitory one, they
use quarterly data, so they can use up to 7 observations per household.
This is a potential problem for quarterly data, as it may result in residual
income autocorrelations of a higher order than the one included in the
permanent component. The authors acknowledge this issue but proceed
without aggregating in annual terms, in order to have a larger number of
observations.
United States
As I detail in the data section, for the United States I am using the PSID
survey from 1998 to get more detailed information on consumption and
wealth. Those 7 waves allow me to estimate the inputs required for the
income calibration from the same data that I use to estimate the household
consumption and saving behaviour.
To get estimates for the observed income variance I follow the estima-
tion procedure detailed in Appendix F. Although I estimate the household
behaviour using data from 2004 to 2010 (the period with the broadest
consumption definition), for the residual earnings variance calibration I
consider the estimation which uses all waves, since it implies the high-
est amount possible of observations. I set the residual earnings variance
σ2log(Y ) = 0.3337.
After generating the residual earnings by removing the predictable com-
ponent from the head and spouse labour earnings I fit a stochastic process
in order to identify the permanent and transitory variance. I follow the
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methodology proposed by Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008). To im-
plement it I adapt the code provided by Heathcote, Perri, and Violante
(2010) to consider the variable definitions and time period that I use. I
set Q = 0.6511 corresponding to a estimated permanent variance (σ2η) of
0.0356 and a transitory variance (σ2ε) of 0.0547.
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Chapter 4
Wealthy hand-to-mouth
consumers
4.1 Introduction
In the two previous chapters I have considered the sample of non home-
owners in analysing how consumption and wealth responses are correlated
with income shocks.
According to Kaplan and Violante (2014), there is a substantial fraction
of the sample which owns a home but behaves as liquidity constrained
hand-to-mouth consumers, even though it has positive net worth due to its
homeownership.
I thus extend the results of the previous chapters to consider homeown-
ers. Durables, like homes, not only provide consumption services, but are
also a means of insurance, since households may liquidate their durable
stocks in response to certain shocks. Thus, I expect a priori that house-
holds’ wealth responses to income shocks over time may differ according to
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the level and composition of their net worth. In particular, I re-examine
the Italian data used in the first chapter and analyse households’ behaviour
according to their durable adjustment.
I summarise the main results as follows. On the one hand, wealth
responses to income shocks over time are downward sloping for the group of
households that adjusts its durable stock. On the other hand, the responses
are upward sloping for those households which do not adjust their durable
stock. This suggests that households which do not adjust have stronger
precautionary saving motives. In line with those results, the consumption
responses increase more steeply for the households which do not adjust
compared to those which do.
I interpret these results as support for the hypothesis of Kaplan and
Violante (2014). The results also support the strategy applied in previous
chapters of identifying the strength of precautionary saving versus perma-
nent income behaviour in the data by looking at the slope of the wealth
and consumption responses.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 briefly
presents the conceptual framework that I use in the chapter. Section 4.3
describes the data used, the sample selection process and the estimation
strategy before presenting the results. Section 4.4 discusses the estimation
results. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Conceptual framework
Kaplan and Violante (2014) formalise a consumption model in which house-
holds can have two kind of assets, one liquid and one illiquid and subject
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to transaction costs. In this chapter I apply their modelling framework to
analyse how homeownership affects the households’ responses to income
shocks.
The argument of Kaplan and Violante (2014) may be summarised as
follows. If the household owns illiquid assets and has not recently ad-
justed them, then the behaviour of non-durable consumption is approxi-
mately characterised by the behaviour of a liquidity constrained consumer,
also called a “wealthy” hand-to-mouth consumer by Kaplan and Violante
(2014). Instead, if the household has adjusted the illiquid assets, it has
re-optimised by adjusting its durable stock and thus its consumption be-
haviour is less affected by the illiquidity of the second set of assets.
The empirical strategy I use is thus the following. I use information
in the SHIW to identify those households which adjust their consumption
of durables and then compare whether their consumption and wealth re-
sponses are systematically different from those households which do not
adjust their consumption of durables.
Not convinced by the work of Bertola, Guiso, and Pistaferri (2005) and
Alvarez, Guiso, and Lippi (2012), who use the value of durables reported in
the SHIW to identify adjustment in the durable stock, I adopt a different
strategy. I consider changes in the quantity of durables to identify the
adjustment, since this procedure is robust to changes in values driven by
price changes. The SHIW is an excellent dataset to use; it allows me to
trace adjustments in quantity while considering, among other things, the
amount of square metres of the main residence. In the next section I provide
more details of the way in which I empirically identify the adjustments.
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4.3 Descriptive analysis
4.3.1 Data
I use the SHIW dataset which I have described in Section 2.3, including
the last wave in 2012, so that the period considered is between 1987 and
2012.
Besides the main advantage of covering a long time span, this extended
dataset has detailed information about the real estate owned by the house-
holds. I consider the type of property, surface area (i.e. footprint) in square
metres, time of ownership and mode of acquisition.
4.3.2 Sample selection
I select those households whose head is between 25 and 55 years old, which
have members who do not own business wealth and are not self-employed,
and have been observed for at least 4 consecutive waves. With respect to
the selected sample that I use in Chapter 2, the households may own real
estate. Therefore the households’ real assets are formed by valuables and
real estate properties.
In terms of housing status, the households could rent (have no prop-
erties), own the main residence and possibly own other properties. The
historical dataset of the SHIW, a dataset provided by the Bank of Italy
which homogenises and aggregates the information collected each wave,
provides information on the way that the household acquired the owner-
ship of the property, detailing if it was purchased, inherited or received as
a gift, or built. Unfortunately there is no specific information on whether
the main residence was bought with a mortgage, or from savings or a fam-
118
ily loan. The historical dataset provides information on mortgages, but
it is not sufficiently detailed. An analysis of each wave’s questionnaires
is needed, with the drawback that the information is not homogeneous. I
discuss this problem below.
Durables adjustment
As mentioned above, the strategy is to identify those households which
adjusted their consumption of durables and compare them with those which
did not adjust it. I focus on housing, which is the largest durable good for
most households.
As adjustment criteria I consider the region of residence, years of posses-
sion of the dwelling and reported square metres. I identify those households
which do not adjust their housing stock if in 4 consecutive waves: they have
always rented their dwelling, or if they owned their main residence they did
not change the region, reported a consistent amount of time spent at the
same address and the same amount of square metres. Furthermore, if they
have another real estate property, I select those households which own the
same number of properties in all waves.
To construct the sample of households which adjusted their housing
stock, I select those households which during the observed period (at least
4 consecutive waves) reported at least one period without owning the main
residence. In other words, this criterion selects households which acquired
the main residence or, for example, as a result of a shock had to sell it and
became renters. The complement of this group, which I am excluding, is
formed by households which adjusted their consumption of durables, but
always reported having ownership of the main residence. In Table H.1 of
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Appendix H I report some statistics to highlight the differences between
these two groups in terms of property ownership. Households which always
own their main residence also own more dwellings for rent or agricultural
land for rent.
Hand-to-mouth consumers
To complement the analysis and further characterise the behaviour of those
households which adjusted or did not, I also analyse the fraction of hand-
to-mouth consumers in those groups. When identifying the hand-to-mouth
households I follow as closely as possible the benchmark definitions in Ka-
plan and Violante (2014) and Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner (Forthcom-
ing). In particular, Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner (Forthcoming) estimate
the amount of hand-to-mouth consumers for Italy by using the Household
Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) between 2008 and 2010. While
the SHIW does not have the same information as the HFCS, I follow their
approach as closely as possible.
For liquid assets I consider various definitions. As a baseline I consider
the net financial wealth reported by the historical dataset of the SHIW.
This asset category consists of deposits in current and savings accounts,
certificates of deposit, repos, government securities, bonds, mutual funds,
equity, shares, foreign securities and loans to cooperatives. All these as-
sets are net of financial liabilities: with banks, financial companies, other
households and trade debt. This measure of liquid wealth is the closest
to Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner (Forthcoming) that can be built with
the historical dataset of the SHIW. The main difference is that I do not
have information on cash holdings, such as the HFCS reports. The results
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presented are, however, robust to alternative definitions which consider
different asset components.
In terms of illiquid assets I adopt the baseline definition of Kaplan,
Violante, and Weidner (Forthcoming) which is net real estate wealth and
then consider other broader measures by adding valuables, vehicles and
other durables such as furniture, furnishings and appliances.
Like Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner (Forthcoming), I identify hand-
to-mouth consumers considering average liquid balances. Therefore I con-
sider poor hand-to-mouth households as those households with no positive
illiquid wealth and net liquid wealth smaller than or equal to half their
monthly labour earnings. Wealthy hand-to-mouth households are defined
using the same restriction in terms of liquid wealth, but hold positive net
illiquid wealth. Given the very low levels of indebtedness of the Italian
households, it is irrelevant to consider alternative definitions of borrowing
constraints by different thresholds of net liquid wealth. Finally I check the
results when alternative definitions of total net worth are considered, in
order to identify hand-to-mouth households.
4.3.3 Empirical findings
Portfolio adjustment
I estimate how changes in consumption and wealth react to changes in in-
come following the empirical strategy that is explained in Chapter 3. The
only changes are in the first step when I construct the shock components
of the variables of interest. When I remove the deterministic predictabil-
ity of the variables, I add the observables related to homeownership com-
pared with the regressions for the sample of non-homeowners detailed in
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Appendix F of the previous chapter. In particular I include dummies to
capture the ownership of the main residence and the number of other prop-
erties owned by type of property: dwelling, other building, agricultural
land and non-agricultural land.
In Table 4.1 I present the consumption and wealth responses to income
shocks over N periods for those households which adjusted and did not
adjust their owned main residence. I consider total net worth as a measure
of wealth. I report all estimation results for median regressions which
minimise absolute deviations and thus are robust to outliers.
Table 4.1: Total net worth: consumption and wealth responses to income
shocks.
Adjusted Non-Adjusted
N βNc β
N
a β
N
c β
N
a
2 0.272 0.875 0.181 0.265
(0.022) (0.248) (0.027) (0.094)
4 0.281 0.662 0.274 0.333
(0.025) (0.274) (0.031) (0.146)
6 0.369 0.643 0.342 0.484
(0.025) (0.317) (0.029) (0.151)
Sample size 962 650
Source: Author’s calculations. Standard errors in parentheses.
The estimated wealth responses for those households which adjusted
their consumption of durables is decreasing in N and, conversely, increas-
ing in N for those which did not adjust. In both cases the estimates are
significantly different from zero. In terms of consumption responses to
income shocks, they are increasing and can be more precisely estimated
than the wealth responses for both groups of households. Those house-
holds which did not adjust their main residence have a lower consumption
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response at N = 2 and exhibit a steeper consumption profile over time.
It is relevant to consider in particular liquid wealth for Italy, notably its
financial assets, which, given the above mentioned characteristics, are the
most probable kind of asset that the household will adjust. The reason is
that Italy has high levels of home ownership (74.1% in 2012 according to
Eurostat) with low levels of development in the mortgage market. Thus,
savings and transfers (or loans) from family and friends are the most com-
mon ways of acquiring homeownership. Hence, I present in Table 4.2 the
estimation results when the value of real estate is excluded from the wealth
measure.
Table 4.2: Financial net worth: consumption and wealth responses to in-
come shocks.
Adjusted Non-Adjusted
N βNc β
N
a β
N
c β
N
a
2 0.272 0.383 0.181 0.115
(0.022) (0.093) (0.027) (0.047)
4 0.281 0.191 0.274 0.209
(0.025) (0.108) (0.031) (0.063)
6 0.369 0.088 0.342 0.253
(0.025) (0.111) (0.029) (0.067)
Sample size 962 650
Source: Author’s calculations. Standard errors in parentheses.
The estimation results when only net financial wealth is considered
as the measure of wealth confirm the results presented above. Wealth
responses are decreasing in N for those households which adjusted their
stock of durables, and increasing in N for those which did not adjust.
The level of wealth responses is smaller, an observation which I plan to
investigate further in future research.
123
In Table 4.3 I report moments of the net worth distribution normalised
by labour income in adult equivalent units. When total wealth is consid-
ered, the differences are obvious, given the higher level of ownership in the
group of households that adjusted. It is more interesting to note what
happens with net financial wealth holdings between the two groups under
review. The bottom part of the net financial assets distribution is very
similar for both groups of households, suggesting that the differences in
terms of wealth responses may be driven by the households in the top of
the distribution.
Table 4.3: Net worth moments of households according housing adjustment
and wealth definition.
Total wealth
Sample size 1stquartile 2ndquartile mean 3rdquartile
Adjusted 962 0.95 3.66 5.04 7.02
Non-Adjusted 650 0.09 0.34 2.05 1.49
Financial wealth
1stquartile 2ndquartile mean 3rdquartile
Adjusted 962 -0.04 0.23 0.37 0.85
Non-Adjusted 650 0.06 0.23 0.50 0.59
Source: Author’s calculations.
To summarise, analysing total wealth or financial wealth alone, the
wealth responses are downward sloping over time for the households which
adjusted and upward sloping for the households which did not adjust. Fur-
thermore, in line with this saving behaviour, the consumption responses
are more steeply increasing for the households which did not adjust than
for those which adjusted.
The results obtained suggest the following interpretation. If the house-
hold adjusted its stock of housing, it exhibits a behaviour similar to a
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permanent-income consumer. If the household did not adjust, it behaves
more like a precautionary-saving consumer. In other words, the households
which adjust have the possibility of liquidating their housing wealth and
thus they respond to the income shocks differently from the households
which did not adjust.
To consider households which adjusted their housing stock by relaxing
any of the above defined criteria, for example the number of square metres
or the number of other properties owned, has selection implications. For
instance, this strategy will include in the same group first time home buy-
ers and households buying a vacation home, or buying a second or third
property to rent. I report the estimation results for the households which
adjusted their durables and always own their main residence in Table H.2
of Appendix H.
Hand-to-mouth households
Up to this point I have characterised the households in terms of their ways
of adjusting their wealth portfolio. In order to further understand the
estimated responses, I now characterise the households in terms of their
portfolio positions.
In Table 4.4 I present the fraction of hand-to-mouth households among
those which adjusted their housing and those that did not. To identify
them I use the methodology presented in Section 4.3. In the table, net
financial assets are defined as liquid wealth. In the first column of the
table I define illiquid wealth as net real estate wealth, computed as the
difference between the value of the properties reported by the household
and mortgages. The columns to the right use broader definitions of illiquid
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wealth.
Table 4.4: Percentage of hand-to-mouth (h-t-m) households in the sample.
Net real (I) + (II) + (III) + other
estate wealth valuables vehicles durables
(Baseline) net worth net worth net worth
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Adjusted
Poor h-t-m 5.4% 1.7% 0.4% 0.1%
Wealthy h-t-m 10.4% 14.1% 15.4% 15.7%
Net worth h-t-m 5.3% 2.6% 0.1% 0.1%
All net worth h-t-m 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5%
Non-Adjusted
Poor h-t-m 18.5% 5.5% 1.5% 0.3%
Wealthy h-t-m 2.6% 15.5% 19.5% 20.8%
Net worth h-t-m 18.3% 9.8% 2.5% 0.6%
All net worth h-t-m 8.9% 8.9% 8.9% 8.9%
Source: Author’s calculations. To compute liquid wealth I consider all
the financial assets net of debts. Net worth hand-to-mouth households are
computed using the sum of the definitions of liquid and illiquid wealth. All
net worth hand-to-mouth households are computed using the aggregate net
worth reported in the SHIW, which includes net financial wealth and real
assets.
In the baseline case, when illiquid wealth is net real estate (column
I) and net worth is constructed by adding liquid and illiquid wealth, the
proportion of hand-to-mouth consumers is 18.3% among those which did
not adjust and 5.3% among those which adjusted. This result is driven
by the higher fraction of households without real estate in the class of
households which did not adjust.
Considering wealth liquidity to classify households allows me to identify
the wealthy hand-to-mouth households which otherwise are not identified
when aggregate measures of wealth are considered. Besides, as is confirmed
in the table, when broader measures of illiquid wealth than housing are
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taken into account (moving from left to right), the composition changes in
favour of wealthy hand-to-mouth households, since some positive net worth
is held in other real assets.
Adding up poor and wealthy hand-to-mouth households, the propor-
tion is 15% in the group which adjusted its durables and 22% among those
who did not, supporting the result obtained with aggregate measures which
indicates a higher fraction of constrained households in the group of house-
holds which did not adjust.
As a robustness check I compute the fractions of hand-to-mouth house-
holds using all SHIW data. The proportion of poor hand-to-mouth is 9.6%
and of wealthy hand-to-mouth is 13.2%. These levels are compatible with
the results of Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner (Forthcoming), which by us-
ing HFCS in the baseline case report 8.3% of poor and 15.5% of wealthy
hand-to-mouth households.
Furthermore, in Table I.1 of Appendix I, I reproduce the computations
considering financial wealth as the sum of deposits in current and savings
accounts, certificates of deposit and repos. With this narrower but more
liquid wealth definition the results are very similar, mostly because these
are the most important asset components of financial wealth.
Another interesting dimension of the data is the incidence of mort-
gagors in the sub-samples. Cloyne and Surico (2014) study the effect of
tax changes on consumption for the United Kingdom. They classify British
households according to their housing tenure and find that the aggregate
consumption responses are driven by the responses of mortgagors, which
react more to income movements due to tax changes than social renters and
home owners. Analysing their wealth holdings, they find that mortgagors
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are wealthy hand-to-mouth consumers, given that they hold mostly illiquid
rather than liquid assets.
For Italy I find that the incidence of mortgagors among the households
which adjusted their durables is 25.8% and 4.5% in those which did not.
If I consider the whole SHIW the fraction of households with mortgages is
only 10.4%.
As explained above, the housing debt market in Italy is not as developed
as, for instance, the United Kingdom’s. It may be the case that those with
access to mortgages, have a better credit rating or access to better credit
conditions. These types of household are predominant in the sub-sample
that adjusted its stock of durables. Their saving behaviour could be closer
to that of a permanent-income consumer. Further research is needed in
this area.
I can summarise the results as follows. First, the proportion of hand-to-
mouth households in Italy is about 20%, a figure in line with the literature.
Second, the results show a higher proportion of hand-to-mouth consumers
in the group of households which did not adjust its stock of durables. These
results are robust to different definitions of the type of assets considered.
This exploration of hand-to-mouth households facilitates the interpre-
tation of the wealth responses estimated before. The figures suggest a rel-
atively larger proportion of hand-to-mouth households among those which
did not adjust durables, in fact, more wealthy hand-to-mouth, when I use
broader measures of illiquid wealth. The upward sloping profile of wealth
over time for these households may result from a precautionary-saving be-
haviour because these households are relatively more constrained.
This evidence not only supports Kaplan and Violante (2014), but also
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the hypothesis of the way in which the slope of wealth to income shocks
over time is influenced by precautionary-savings and permanent-income
behaviour.
4.4 Discussion
The work conducted in this chapter needs further effort to make results
more robust and improve the understanding of the evidence.
One criticism is related to the problem of endogeneity when including
households with real estate in the estimated regressions of the way that
wealth reacts to income shocks. The shocks on housing wealth may be
systematically correlated with income shocks. This is why Krueger and
Perri (2011) exclude home owners from their sample.
Another criticism is related to the strength of the presence of hand-to-
mouth households in each group. Although there are different proportions
of financially constrained households between those which adjusted and
those which did not, data sources imply that the difference is not very
great. Recall that the SHIW, as opposed to the HFCS, does not report cash
holdings. While there is more detailed information in the SHIW annual
datasets than in the historical databases, the drawback is that the data
series are less consistent over time.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have revisited the question of households’ reactions to
income shocks in terms of consumption and savings. I have investigated
whether households’ behaviour is affected by their level of net worth and
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its composition, in particular in terms of liquid and illiquid.
I find that households which adjust their housing stock show responses
of wealth to income shocks which decrease over time. Conversely, those
households which did not adjust exhibit an increasing profile of wealth
responses over time.
This evidence can be interpreted as follows. Those households which
adjusted their housing stock, re-optimise their wealth portfolio and thus
react differently from those households which did not adjust and are more
affected by the illiquid nature of their wealth. When I analyse the liquidity
of the wealth of the two groups I find a higher incidence of hand-to-mouth
households in the sub-sample which did not adjust. This evidence, though
preliminary, supports Kaplan and Violante (2014) and the strategy used
in previous chapters of the thesis, to identify precautionary-savings or per-
manent income behaviour by looking at the wealth responses to income
shocks over time.
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Appendix H
Households which adjusted
their housing stock
Table H.1: Comparison of households with respect to adjustment of their
owned main residence
Bought/sold main resid. Always owned main resid.
Mean Mean
Uncond. Cond. Uncon. Cond.
Total properties 0.68 1.25 1.58 1.58
Other properties 0.14 1.32 0.58 1.71
Dwellings 0.17 1.11 0.32 1.36
Other building 0.03 1.06 0.08 1.25
Agricultural land 0.05 1.13 0.17 1.28
Non-agric. land 0.02 1.10 0.03 1.12
Real Estate Wealth 79,485 143,383 186,337 186,337
Source: Author’s calculations. Note: Conditional means are computed
with respect to owning the type of property mentioned in the descrip-
tion. For instance, regarding other properties, the average number of other
properties for all the households which bought or sold the main residence
is 0.14, but among those which have other properties the average is 1.32.
Real estate wealth is expressed in Euros of year 2000.
132
Table H.2: Consumption and wealth responses of households which ad-
justed their durable consumption and always owned their main residence
Consumption Total Wealth Financial Wealth
N βNc β
N
a β
N
a
2 0.266 1.238 0.266
(0.018) (0.251) (0.055)
4 0.280 1.440 0.289
(0.018) (0.253) (0.070)
6 0.290 1.466 0.324
(0.018) (0.265) (0.074)
Sample size 1749
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Appendix I
Hand-to-mouth consumers: a
narrower definition of liquid
assets
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Table I.1: Fraction of hand-to-mouth (h-t-m) households in the sample:
narrower definition of financial wealth.
Net real (I) + (II) + (III) + other
estate wealth valuables vehicles durables
(Baseline) net worth net worth net worth
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Adjusted
Poor h-t-m 6.1% 1.7% 0.5% 0.1%
Wealthy h-t-m 12.3% 16.7% 17.9% 18.3%
Net worth h-t-m 6.1% 2.7% 0.1% 0.1%
All net worth h-t-m 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5%
Non-Adjusted
Poor h-t-m 18.8% 5.7% 1.5% 0.3%
Wealthy h-t-m 2.6% 15.7% 19.8% 21.1%
Net worth h-t-m 18.6% 10.0% 2.5% 0.6%
All net worth h-t-m 8.9% 8.9% 8.9% 8.9%
Source: Author’s calculations. To compute liquid wealth I consider deposits
in current and saving accounts, certificate of deposits and repos, net of
financial debts. Net worth hand-to-mouth households are computed using
the sum of the definitions of liquid and illiquid wealth. All net worth hand-
to-mouth households are computed using the aggregate net worth reported
in the SHIW, which includes net financial wealth and real assets.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis has studied how households respond to income shocks by an-
alysing their consumption and saving behaviour over time. The main ob-
jective has been to understand what we can learn from households’ saving
decisions, in particular about the importance of precautionary-savings and
consumption-smoothing motives.
In Chapter 2 I have shown that the two leading theoretical models for
studying consumption and saving decisions, the permanent-income model
and the precautionary-saving incomplete-markets model, may both gener-
ate a decreasing wealth profile over time. With reference to Krueger and
Perri (2011), I show that decreasing wealth responses over time do not allow
us to rule out the presence of borrowing constraints. Moreover, I have illus-
trated that the slope of the wealth responses to income shocks identifies the
strength of the precautionary-saving motives relative to permanent-income
motives.
In Chapter 3 I have extended this research by providing international
evidence. I have structurally estimated a precautionary-saving incomplete-
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markets model for Chile, Spain and the United States. Surprisingly, I have
found that, despite the dissimilar financial development of the considered
countries, the household behaviour and estimated parameters are quite sim-
ilar, suggesting that the financial market differences between the countries
are not very important.
Finally in Chapter 4 I have extended the analysis to include homeown-
ership. Following Kaplan and Violante (2014), I have classified households
into two groups according to whether or not they adjusted their housing
stock and whether they are constrained in terms of liquid assets. Working
with the Italian dataset that I used in the first chapter, I find support for
the hypothesis of Kaplan and Violante (2014) and the strategy to iden-
tify households that exhibit precautionary saving motives according to the
slope of their wealth response to income shocks over time.
The results of the thesis confirm the adopted empirically strategy to
identify the relative strength of the precautionary-savings motive and the
consumption-smoothing motive by analysing how the wealth responses to
income shocks evolve over time.
The next step in my research agenda is to formulate a structural model
which incorporates housing, as in Chapter 4. The estimation of the size of
precautionary-savings with such a model will allow me to further test the
robustness of the results in this thesis.
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